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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 19, 1992, Leonel Herrera came within minutes of
execution.2 He had been convicted and sentenced to death for
the murder of a Texas police officer a decade earlier. Now, as-
serting a Perry Mason-like claim of innocence ("My brother did
it") in a successive habeas petition, Herrera received a stay from
the federal district judge only to see it vacated promptly by the.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.3
The Supreme Court then refused, in a five to four vote, to
grant a stay.4 Because this split suggested the probability of
four votes for review on the merits of his contentions, rejected by
the court below, Herrera's attorneys immediately petitioned for
certiorari while simultaneously knocking on various courthouse
doors, federal and state, in a frantic effort to keep the case and
the client alive.5 Before sunrise, the Justices agreed to hear the
matter but affirmed the previous stay denial.6 Their ruling
risked the travesty of an inmate's constitutional claims being
deemed sufficiently substantial to warrant plenary judicial con-
sideration-yet insufficiently substantial to warrant protection
from instant mooting by death!7 In a final round in this
2. The course of events described below is set forth in Marcia Coyle & Marianne
Lavelle, Capital Appeal Becomes a Court Tug of War, NATL L.J., Mar. 2, 1992, at 5.
3. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992).
4. Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992) (Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, and Souter voted to grant the stay of execution).
5. Eleventh-hour litigation of this nature is typical of capital proceedings. See,
e.g., TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY
CASES 46 (1990) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; Ad Hoc Committee on Federal
Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, Report on Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 45
Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239, 3239-40 (Sept. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Powell Committee
Report]; see also Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on
Recent Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1665,
1668, 1685 (1990) (noting respective views on the subject of the Powell Committee
Report and the Task Force Report).
6. Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
7. Such an unseemly outcome is possible because the Court's "Rule of Four" calls
for a grant of certiorari, in death cases as in others, on less than a majority vote.
ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.4, at 230 (7th ed. 1993).
Until the retirement of Justice Powell, this risk did not materialize-he always pro-
vided the fifth vote for a stay, if needed, even when opposed to review himself.
Coyle & Lavelle, supra note 2, at 29. Notably, sometimes a Justice has dissented
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endgame of "chicken," the' Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
blinked before the high Court and canceled the scheduled execu-
tion.'
Media attention to Herrera, which had lapsed with the resolu-
tion of the grisly maneuvering over the stay, revived when the
sideshow yielded at last to the main event.9 The Court heard
oral argument by lawyers for the petitioner and for the State of
Texas in the first week of the October 1992 Term. ° If anything,
the prisoner posed an issue even more dramatically compelling
than the circumstances of his reprieve. His first "Question[] Pre-
sented" was "[w]hether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
permit a state to execute an individual who is innocent of the
crime for which he or she was convicted and sentenced to
death."" The answer, abstractly, had to be "no."2 Indeed, the
State could not lawfully imprison such a person either'--in the
from a stay order only to "end by supporting the defendant in the ultimate disposi-
tion on the merits. Compare, e.g., Wainwright v. Ford, 467 U.S. 1220, 1222 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting from refusal to vacate stay) with Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 427 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in
part) (overturning sentence of death and remanding for hearing on incompetency
claim).
8. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 859 (1993). Chief Justice Rehnquist's later
opinion for the Court simply recites the fact of the stay without mentioning the
brouhaha preceding its entry. Id.
9. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Court Hears Condemned Texan's Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 1992, at B22; Steve McGonigle, Court Hears Case on Texas Man's Innocence
Claim, DALLAS MORNING POST, Oct. 8, 1992, at 4A; David G. Savage, High Court
Asked to Allow Execution Despite Evidence, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at Al.
10. See Arguments Heard, 52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3038 (Oct. 14, 1992) (Herrera
argued Oct. 7, 1992).
11. Brief for Petitioner at i, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (No.
91-7328).
12. Doing so would surely entail "the gratuitous infliction of suffering," in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
158 (1987) (proscribing the imposition of the death penalty absent "major participa-
tion in the felony committed" and "reckless indifference to human life").
13. See generally Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2497 (1991) (stating that
under the Fourteenth Amendment, "no person may be punished criminally save upon
proof of some specific illegal conduct"); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667
(1962) ("Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the
'crime' of having a common cold."). Solely from a public relations standpoint, the
Court hardly could disclaim interest in whether a person sentenced to death was
actually innocent. Cf Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 874-75 & n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring)
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event its agents knew or ought to have known the pertinent
facts. 4
But guilt and innocence lack meaning, in legal as opposed to
moral terms, absent a setting in which fallible human actors can
determine their existence. 5 That setting, of course, has tradi-
tionally been the criminal trial. Since Herrera sought to impugn
the outcome of that trial, he confronted the much tougher issue,
contained in his second "Question[] Presented," of "[w]hat post-
conviction procedures are necessary to protect against the execu-
tion of an innocent person?"" This added query, though open-
ended and never precisely addressed in his brief,7 implicitly
invited the Court to respond in Herrera's favor in ways it likely
would find unwelcome.
The petitioner's belated claim of innocence seemed to demand
the constitutionalization of the universal, yet highly disfa-
vored,18 statutory motion for a new trial based on newly discov-
ered evidence or the federalization of such a motion e via the
(noting the Court's understandable reluctance "to admit publicly that Our Perfect
Constitution lets stand any injustice, much less the execution of an innocent man")
(footnote omitted).
14. See infra note 418 (discussing the appropriate threshold showing to trigger
constitutional right to vindicate a post-trial claim of innocence).
15. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
16. Brief for Petitioner at i, Herrera (No. 91-7328); cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 435 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Since no State sanctions execution
of the insane, the real battle being fought in this case is over what procedures must
accompany the inquiry into sanity.").
17. The petitioner simply requested a remand for some sort of hearing by the
district court on his claim of innocence. Brief for Petitioner at 31, 42, 45, Herrera
(No. 91-7328). He devoted less than a page and a half out of 45 pages to general
comments about possible procedures and standards applicable to its disposition. See
id. at 43-44; see also Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861 (noting Herrera's imprecision in
describing proposed federal relief). Doubtless, he selected this course for strategic
reasons-preferring to stress the obvious horror of killing an innocent over the
murky practical problems inherent in trying to avoid that consequence years after
verdict and judgment.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 86-87, 99-106.
19. The latter might be viewed as constitutionalizing by indirection: pressuring,
though not actually forcing, states like Texas to revamp post-trial procedures in
order to avert, or at least postpone, review by a federal habeas court. See generally
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)-(c) (1988) (requiring exhaustion of remedies available in state
court prior to review).
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increasingly scorned" habeas remedy-or, possibly, both. As
Texas barred any such challenge made more than thirty days
from the date of sentence,2' and Herrera had waited over eight
years,22 he argued that the district court must now give him a
"meaningful post-trial opportunity" to prove his innocence. In
the circumstances, the court may have construed his argument
as a call to invalidate all time limits on motions to consider new
evidence24 filed by prisoners sentenced to death. Alternatively,
the court could have viewed it as a contention that habeas
courts should play backstop to recalcitrant state systems without
post-conviction procedures open to those in Herrera's position.
Finally, he may have been requesting the best of state and fed-
eral worlds: compulsory state corrective process (here, an out-of-
time motion for a new trial) and federal review of disappointing
results on the merits.
To be sure, at this stage Herrera was asking only to return to
the district court.2 He was understandably coy about the proce-
dural ramifications of his proposed substantive rule that the
execution of an innocent person violates the Constitution. The
Justices, however, could hardly ignore these implications,"
20. See infra note 177 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 185.
21. See TEX. R. APP. P. ANN. r. 31(a)(1) (West 1993) (barring a motion for a new
trial after 30 days). The Texas courts construe the 30-day bar on the motion as
jurisdictional. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860 (citations omitted); see also Ex parte May,
717 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ("The existence of newly discovered evi-
dence relevant to the guilt of the applicant is not a ground for relief in a post-con-
viction writ of habeas corpus.").
22. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 856, 858.
23. Brief for Petitioner at 38, Herrera (No. 91-7328) (original quotation in capi-
tals).
24. All jurisdictions provide for such motions, but just 15 permit their filing more
than three years after conviction. Of these, six have waivable bars; only nine have
no limitation. Approximately one third of the states impose a cutoff of 60 days. See
generally Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 865-66 & nn.8-11 (listing the pertinent provisions of
the states and the District of Columbia). The current version of Rule 33 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure contains a two-year bar on motions for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, which the courts have construed strictly. See,
e.g., United States v. Spector, 888 F.2d 583, 584 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Cook, 705 F.2d 350, 351 (9th Cir. 1983).
25. See supra text accompanying note 23 and note 17.
26. As Justice Scalia acerbically remarked during argument, "We have a right to
probe the reach of the rules we establish in this court." Arguments Heard, supra
note 10, at 3039.
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when the petitioner suggested merely that "what is required by
due process will likely depend as an initial matter upon the
corrective procedures provided by the state courts."27 Fur-
thermore, precedent and theory in several areas-coupled with
pragmatic considerations-ensured that prescribing a post-trial
process for capital inmates to challenge their guilt would have
posed problems even for a Court more sympathetic to con-
demned petitioners than the current Court. Herrera's case, thus,
facially presented the paradox of a fairly obvious right to be
spared from death if ultimately known to be innocent, without
any seeming (judicial) remedy for its practical vindication.
The prisoner's dilemma, to borrow a phrase, had now become
the Court's as well.
Herrera v. Collins was handed down on January 25, 1993.9
Predictably, the petitioner lost.3" Relegating him to executive
clemency, six Justices held that he was not entitled to judicial
review of his claim of innocence and therefore affirmed the judg-
ment below.31 In the following pages, I will first briefly describe
Herrera's facts and procedural history prior to the grant of cer-
tiorari.3 ' Then, departing from convention, I postpone discus-
sion of the several opinions in Herrera until I have treated the
various, potentially inconsistent themes and doctrines
that-from a forward-looking vantage-appeared to bear on the
resolution of this very troubling case.33 Although differing only
in style from the usual, after-the-fact assessment of the Justices'
work product, that method strikes me as fairer where the ques-
tion is controversial.34 (Justice Blackmun, indeed, suggested
27. Brief for Petitioner at 44, Herrera (No. 91-7328). Elliptically, he added: "If a
state provides a death sentenced inmate with a meaningful, full and fair opportunity
to present the claim, then perhaps a federal court's role is more limited." Id.
28. For a discussion of the route of executive clemency, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 129-47.
29. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
30. He was executed shortly thereafter, on May 12, 1993. Man in Case on Curb-
ing New Evidence Is Executed, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1993, at A14.
31. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 853-70. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter dissent-
ed. Id. at 876-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. See infra part II.
33. See infra part III.
34. See Susan Blaustein, The Executioner's Wrong, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at
C1, C4 (discussing the appeal of death row inmate Gary Graham).
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that the majority's disposition came close to sanctioning "simple
murder"!35 ) If nothing else, by educating the reader beforehand,
it may convey the difficulty of the Court's task more vividly than
the traditional hindsight analysis.
Yet in the end, after describing what the Justices said and
did,36 I reject the outcome in Herrera. This rejection derives in
part from my opposition to much of the background jurispru-
dence of the past decade, which has curtailed the procedural and
substantive relief available to capital litigants.37 My recom-
mended result might well fall short, however, of satisfying many
who sided with the petitioner.
In a nutshell, I conclude that a death-sentenced prisoner as-
serting innocence on the basis of new evidence should have a
constitutional right to file a motion for a new trial or similar
action in state court at any time-regardless of otherwise opera-
tive periods of limitation. With more hesitation, I also conclude
that the right may not be burdened by the strict "due diligence"
requirements prevalent in the pertinent law.38 Within broad
limits, however, the State would be free to define the substan-
tive, procedural, and evidentiary features of this proceeding. 9
Concomitantly, I envision a minimal role for habeas.40 While
federal courts should continue to play a prominent part in en-
suring the constitutional liberties of state defendants,4' their
35. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The other dissenters did
not join this portion of his opinion.
36. See infra part IV.
37. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions" on Life or Death-If They're
Arbitrary, Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1070-82 (1991) (discussing Eighth Amendment law retrench-
ments); Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 9 (1990) (discussing the contraction of habeas corpus). But cf Louis D. Bilionis,
Legitimating Death, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1643 (1993) (viewing these trends in a more
positive, light). See generally infra parts III.C, III.D.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 419-22; see generally infra part V.
39. A state could not place unreasonable obstacles in the way of the death-sen-
tenced prisoner. See infra notes 404-05.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 423-39.
41. That role has been diminished by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plural-
ity opinion), and its progeny, see, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993);
Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993), which prohibit habeas courts from an-
nouncing or applying new rules of criminal procedure except in the narrowest cir-
cumstances, see infra text accompanying notes 190-94, as well as by other restric-
1994] 949
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resources and expertise are poorly expended in second-guessing
the factual findings of local judges or juries on guilt.42
Had the Justices chosen this tack, they could have announced
(uncontroversially) the substantive rule that the Eighth Amend-
ment bars execution of an innocent person. They then should
have held that capital defendants with newly discovered evi-
dence of innocence possess the related procedural entitlement to
a belated new trial motion in an appropriate state forum. In my
view, these rights ought to be vindicated almost exclusively in
the state courts-with federal judges wielding the writ mainly to
ensure the availability and basic fairness of the local remedy. To
a large extent, if not entirely,43 present habeas law supports
the narrow review that I recommend in the novel setting of
"Herrera claims." But that circumstance carries less weight than
it otherwise might, in light of the actual result in Herrera. Plain-
ly, for now, federal redress for capital inmates " 'in favor of un-
fortunate guilt' ,,41 must come from Congress," if at all. A
clean slate awaits the pen.
II. HERRERA: THE FACTS
46
At Leonel Herrera's murder trial in January 1982, the jurors
heard that, on the night of September 29, 1981, a passerby
found the dead body of police officer David Rucker on a highway
north of Brownsville, Texas. Rucker had been shot in the
head.47 At approximately the same time on the same road, Offi-
tions in habeas jurisprudence since the 1970's.
42. See generally infra text accompanying notes 373-88.
43. See infra notes 433, 439.
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed.
1987).
45. Very likely, however, if Congress enacts some form of redress for Herrera
claimants, it would incorporate the new provision-into the current habeas statutes. A
bill on the subject is pending now. See Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1993, S. 1441,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1993); David G. Savage, Plan Could Let Condemned Get
Hearing for Fresh Facts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at A12.
46. The following prdcis does not exhaust the factual and procedural detail of
Herrera. Like most capital prosecutions of elderly vintage, this complex case
possesses a voluminous record. The pertinent events are set forth in the Chief
Justice's majority opinion, Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 857-58 & n.1, and in Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion. Id. at 871-72.
47. Id. at 857.
950 [Vol. 35:943
GATEWAY OF INNOCENCE
cer Enrique Carrisalez pulled over a speeding car traveling away
from the scene of the killing. After a brief exchange of words,
the driver fired at Carrisalez. He died of his wounds nine days
later.48 It was Carrisalez' slaying-observed by his passenger,
Enrique Hernandez-that led to the capital prosecution at issue
in the present case.49
Both Hernandez' eyewitness testimony and a dying declara-
tion by Carrisalez identified Leonel Herrera as the killer. 0 This
direct evidence was bolstered by scientific and other circumstan-
tial proof as well as, somewhat more obliquely, a letter written
by the defendant and found on him at the time of arrest. Among
other things, the prosecution linked Herrera to the automobile
involved in the murder: a license plate check revealed its owner-
ship by his girlfriend, and he had its keys and was known to
drive it. 5 Further, splatters of blood on this car and on
Herrera's jeans and wallet matched Rucker's blood type-but not
Herrera's.52 The defendant's social security card was discovered
alongside Rucker's car. Finally, the letter, although disjointed
and confusing, implied knowledge of the circumstances of the
deaths of the two police officers.5" It suggested that Rucker had
died for reasons relating to his involvement, with Herrera, in
the drug trade. Carrisalez (who " 'had not to do in this [sic]' 1154)
had died, presumably, only because he halted the vehicle.
Following his initial unsuccessful appeals and denials of post-
conviction relief, state and federal,55 the defendant began a sec-
ond round of habeas proceedings in the Texas courts and later in
federal district court, raising for the first time a claim that he
48. Id.
49. Also charged with the Rucker killing, Herrera pleaded guilty to murder in con-
nection with that offense in July 1982. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The car also contained some strands of hair determined to be Rucker's. Id.
53. The majority opinion quotes the letter in full. See id. at 857-58 n.1. Herrera
told interrogating officers that if they wished to know what had happened, " 'it was
all in the letter' and . . .they should read it." See id. at 872 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1131 (1985)).
54. Id. at 857 n.1 (citation omitted).
55. Attacks on his identifications by Hernandez and Carrisalez figured prominently
in these challenges. Id. at 858.
19941 951
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was actually innocent.56 Supplementing his paper showing as
he went, he ultimately proffered four affidavits: these all pointed
to the guilt of Raul Herrera, Sr., the petitioner's brother, who
had himself been murdered in 1984."
Three of the affidavits reported post-trial admissions by Raul
Sr. that he alone had shot the officers.58 While two of the
affiants had been Raul Sr.'s friends (and one a former cellmate
as well), the third was a former state judge.59 As a practicing
attorney, the latter, Hector Villarreal, had represented Raul Sr.
in 1984 on an unrelated criminal charge. Villarreal's statement,
recounting his client's, reported that Raul Sr.-with Leonel,
their father, Officer Rucker, and the local sheriff-had partici-
pated in drug trafficking.0 After Leonel's conviction, Raul, Sr.
blackmailed the sheriff and, according to Villarreal, was killed
by an associate who had been at the scene during the murders
and wished to silence Raul Sr.61 Lastly, an affidavit by the
petitioner's nephew purported to give a firsthand account of the
relevant events-observed by him at the age of nine. Raul
Herrera, Jr., asserted that only his father, Raul Sr., had been
responsible for the deaths and that Leonel had not even been at
the scene of the crime.6
The district judge dismissed the bulk of the petitioner's claims
on the ground of abuse of the writ.63 But he ordered a stay so
that Herrera could once again present his (now fully document-
ed) claim of innocence to the state court.6 The Court of Appeals
56. See id.
57. None of the affidavits was signed before December 1990. See id. at 858 nn.2-3.
58. Id. at 858.
59. See Brief for Petitioner at 25-26, Herrera (No. 91-7328); Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at
884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The opinion sets out the affidavits in some detail.
See id. at 858 & nn.2-3:
60. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858 n.2.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 858 & n.3.
63. See generally infra text accompanying note 222 and note 223 and accompany-
ing text (discussing this doctrine).
64. His disposition envisioned dismissing the federal petition and lifting the stay
upon the filing of the state proceeding, a somewhat puzzling course of action since
the judge undoubtedly knew that the Texas courts do not address new-evidence
claims on collateral review. See id. at 873 (O'Connor, J., concurring). He also knew,
though, that Texas normally adheres to a rule of "habeas abstention," which bars
952 [Vol. 35:943
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for the Fifth Circuit vacated the stay, affirming the dismissals
and holding that the unabused contentions, including that of
actual innocence, furnished no cause for federal relief.65 A grant
of certiorari followed.6
III. THEMES AND PRECEDENTS
A. Innocence as Icon, Guilt as Base Line
The spectre of conviction and, even worse, execution of an
innocent individual haunts our system. That is fitting in a
civilized society, whose criminal justice institutions have as their
predominant aim to punish the guilty and free the innocent. 8
This concern, the cornerstone of the procedural edifice of pre-
adjudication of a state petition whose substance is pending in federal habeas. See
May v. Collins, 948 F.2d 162, 169 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 907
(1992). Perhaps his expressed " 'sense of fairness and due process,' " Herrera, 113 S.
Ct. at 873, led him to temporize, in the hope that the state court would ignore this
doctrine. Cf Ex parte Herrera, No. 81-CR-672-C (Tex. 197th Jud. Dist., Jan. 14,
1991) (reproduced in Joint Appendix at 10, 12, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853
(1993) (No. 91-7328), and quoted in part at 113 S. Ct. at 858) (denying earlier claim
of innocence on the merits). In addition, upon reconsideration, the district judge
granted an evidentiary hearing on a Brady claim, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963) (requiring prosecutorial disclosure of exculpatory information to a criminal
defendant), alleging that law enforcement authorities had consciously withheld the
exculpatory matter set, out in the text. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859.
65. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029, 1034 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he existence mere-
ly of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a
ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.").
66. See supra text accompanying note 6.
67. See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 68 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("The execution of someone who is completely innocent . . . [is] the ultimate horror
case.") (internal quotations omitted) (quoting John Kaplan, The Problem of Capital
Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 555, 576). Jim Mattox, a former Attorney General of
Texas, wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times supporting Herrera: "[M]y
worst nightmare would have been the execution of an innocent person." Jim Mattox,
On Not Executing an Innocent Prisoner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, at A28 (letter to
the editor). For a discussion of the incidence of erroneous convictions in capital cas-
es, see infra text accompanying notes 365-69.
68. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1729 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the "central goal of the criminal justice system [is] accurate
determinations of guilt and innocence"); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230
(1975) (stating that the "primary responsibility" of the criminal justice system is to
develop "relevant facts on which a determination of guilt or innocence can be
made").
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sumptive innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt,69 has
most often found expression in variations on Blackstone's max-
im: "[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one
innocent suffer." ° More important, the goal inspiring the apho-
rism has achieved concrete form in the many constitutional trial
protections such as the rights to assistance of counsel, compulso-
ry process, and confrontation of adverse witnesses that build on
the basic structural bias handicapping the prosecution.
Despite the theoretical skew, practical factors (for example,
greater resources) favor the State.7" That reality elevates the
need to respect and, at times, enhance safeguards geared to the
vindication of innocence even, or especially, after judgment,
when officialdom's interest shifts from the prisoner. No sys-
tem, however, can rest sensibly on the premise that findings of
guilt are wrong. 3 In order to resolve this tension, upon convic-
tion the law reverses the hallowed presumption74 while not ren-
dering it irrebuttable. Yet although numerous claims may im-
69. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-63 (1970) (giving those
principles' long pedigree).
70. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352. See also Winship, 397 U.S. at
372 (Harlan, J., concurring); Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the
Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 459-60 (1989) (positing that presump-
tion of innocence reflects the value society ascribes to protecting the innocent). The
sentiment has also surfaced in famous nonlegal sources. See, e.g., VOLTAIRE, ZADIG
ch. 6 (1747). Predictably, law and literature reflect a cynical countertradition as well.
See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977) ("Due process does not
require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the
possibility of convicting an innocent person."); supra text accompanying note 1.
71. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1199 (1960) (arguing that modifications in
criminal procedure have disadvantaged defendants by not compensating for prose-
cutorial advantage in discovery and other "inequalitie[s] of litigating position").
72. See, e.g., Blaustein, supra note 34, at C4 (noting that "thick administrative
inertia" sets in when a capital conviction becomes final).
73. A classic exposition of the value of repose in criminal litigation generally ap-
pears in Justice Harlan's dissent in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963):
Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in
insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes with
an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on
whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the
prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.
Id. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Plainly, these comments did not take note of
the special case of the death-sentenced inmate.
74. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
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pugn the accuracy of a verdict, some more directly75 than oth-
ers, prevailing constitutional doctrine sanctions only the nar-
rowest form of frontal challenge to the proof against the defen-
dant. Under Jackson v. Virginia,7 7 judicial scrutiny is limited to
the question "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt."7' Due process, here, demands no more.
This minimal standard of legal sufficiency,7" applied to a
fixed paper record, avails the Herreras not at all. It goes to
quantity, not quality, of proof (the former, barely) and, fatally,
confines review to the evidence adduced before the jury. -Since
Jackson lays so heavy a thumb on the prosecutor's side of the
75. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (conviction of a type
of fraudulent scheme not barred by statute); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985) (state's withholding of exculpatory evidence); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935) (prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony).
76. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (deprivation of effec-
tive assistance of counsel); Davis v. Alaska 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (denial of impeach-
ment of key prosecution witness for bias); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)
(impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure).
77. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
78. Id. at 319.
79. Notably, the Jackson test replaced the even less demanding standard of
Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). Thompson, in the words of the Jackson
majority, invalidated "a conviction based upon a record wholly devoid of any relevant
evidence of a crucial element of the offense charged." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314 (em-
phasis added). Jackson thereby secured "the most elemental of due process rights:
freedom from a wholly arbitrary deprivation of liberty." Id. By the time of Jackson,
'In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), already had established the constitutional neces-
sity of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" showing. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315. Jack-
son, in turn, made clear that the rule of Winship governed in habeas as well as on
appeal. The Court recently deflected an invitation to gut Jackson's protection by
giving state court sufficiency findings deferential, instead of plenary, review in habe-
as proceedings. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992). Indeed, the Court has
been enlarging Jackson's purview in the capital habeas setting. See Sawyer v.
Whitley, 112 S. Ct 2514 (1992) (holding that if a rational fact finder could have
found the defendant eligible for the death penalty under state law, he was not "ac-
tually innocent" of the penalty); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 781-84 (1990) (find-
ing that if the state court's application of aggravating circumstance to the defendant
fulfills the rational fact finder test, it passes constitutional muster).
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scales," a defendant like Herrera must search elsewhere for
useful precedent.
In theory, a prisoner who wants to attack a conviction or sen-
tence on the basis of extra-record material has two potential,
and radically different, routes to pursue: a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence and a request for executive
clemency. In actuality, each poses substantial problems for the
defendant. While both options exist in every jurisdiction that
allows capital punishment,"' they are creatures of local law
(statutory and constitutional) rather than of federal constitution-
al right.s2 Clemency, moreover-a nonjudicial, rarely granted
form of relief-partakes less of "law" than of grace,' yet capital
inmates routinely seek it.' I will now examine these in turn,
with a view to assessing their viability for claimants in
Herrera's shoes.
80. Among other things, Jackson's lower court progeny stress that assessing the
credibility of witnesses and weighing the evidence are tasks for the jury. See, e.g.,
United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1458 (5th Cir. 1992); Wilcox v. Ford,
813 F.2d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925 (1987). Mere inconsisten-
cies in the proof will not undermine a verdict of guilt. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Parker v. Fairman, 695 F. Supp. 404, 406 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The reviewing court may
reject testimony solely if it is facially incredible, "assert[ing] facts that the witness
physically could not have observed or events that could not have occurred under the
laws of nature." United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1405 (5th Cir. 1991). But cf
Louis M. Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Conti-
nuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 445-46 (1980)
(surmising that the Jackson rule may nullify a conviction even if the State can
demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by time of habeas corpus proceeding).
81. See supra note 24 (discussing provisions for a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence); see also Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained:
Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 575 (1991) (dis-
cussing clemency). See generally Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 867-68 & n.14 (enumerating
36 states' provisions on clemency).
82. The sole exception is the President's Article II "Power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for Offenses against the United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
83. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160-61 (1833).
84. Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in Capital Clemency
Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 896 (1981).
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B. State Law: Judicial and Executive Avenues
1. New Trial Motion Based on, Newly Discovered Evidence5
If victory on a Jackson challenge usually amounts to "mission
impossible," success on a motion for a new trial grounded on
newly discovered evidence might be described as "mission im-
probable." Hostility to the inconvenience of reopening closed
cases blends with genuine skepticism about the probity of efforts
to do so. The pertinent rules, a mixture of judge-made and legis-
lative standards, are facially demanding."5 Furthermore, in ap-
plying the law to specific facts, courts favor the government on
matters like witness credibility. 7 But nonetheless, deserving
prisoners sometimes win."8 All things considered, new trial mo-
85. The case law on this topic is vast. Useful annotations, on which the following
general discussion relies heavily, include: Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Standard for
Granting or Denying New Trial in State Criminal Case on Basis of Recanted Testi-
mony-Modern Cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 1031 (1990) [hereinafter Thomas, State Annota-
tion]; Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Recantation of Testimony of Witness as Grounds
for New Trial-Federal Criminal Cases, 94 A.L.R. FED. 60 (1989); [hereinafter Thom-
as, Federal Annotation]; Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, What Standard, Regarding
Necessity for Change of Trial Result, Applies in Granting New Trial Pursuant to
Rule 33 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for Newly Discovered Evidence of
False Testimony by Prosecution Witness, 59 A.L.R. FED. 657 (1982); John A. Glenn,
Annotation, What Constitutes "Newly Discovered Evidence" Within Meaning of Rule
33 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Relating to Motions for New Trial, 44
A.L.R. FED. 13 (1979). But apart from comments on specific decisions, academic work
on the subject is sparse. It consists mainly of student work and tends to focus on
recantations. See, e.g., Janice J. Repka, Comment, Rethinking the Standard for New
Trial Motions Based upon Recantations as Newly Discovered Evidence, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 1433 (1986); Daniel Wolf, Note, I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standard for New
Trial in False Testimony Cases, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1925 (1985).
86. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2519 (1992) (referring to "rigor-
ous standards for granting such motions"); United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 72
(2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1953 (1993) (stating that a " 'district court
must exercise "great caution" in determining' " such motions and may grant them
" 'only "in the most extraordinary circumstances" ") (quoting United States v.
Imran, 964 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. DiPaolo, 835
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 626 (1992))).
87. That conclusion derives from a survey of many decisions. See generally supra
note 85 (citing pertinent annotations).
88. See, e.g., Casias v. United States, 337 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1964) (third party
confessed to crime); Ledet v. United States, 297 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1962) (owner of
car in which heroin was found recanted testimony implicating defendant, a passen-
ger, in narcotics violation); United States v. Flynn, 130 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(recanting informant gave false testimony against allegedly subversive defendants),
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tions afford a modicum of due process to inmates with Herrera
claims, capital or otherwise, so long as their proffers are not
summarily rejected on account of inflexible time limitations. 9
The so-called Berry standard for evaluating newly discovered
evidence holds sway in many states and a number of federal
circuits.9" This test requires that the evidence have come to
light after trial, not been obtainable earlier in the exercise of
due diligence,9 and be more than merely cumulative or im-
peaching. Rather, the new facts must be so important as proba-
bly to cause a different result upon retrial. 2 When dealing with
a recantation, several jurisdictions (mainly federal) employ the
alternative Larrison test.93 In order to grant relief under
Larrison, the court must feel "reasonably well satisfied" that a
material witness' story was a lie94 and that, without it, the
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 127-28.
90. It derives from the nineteenth century Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851). See
id. at 527-28 (outlining the requirements for application for a new trial). For a dis-
cussion of its requisites, see Sharon Cobb, Note, Gary Dotson as Victim: The Legal
Response to Recanting Testimony, 35 EMoRY L.J. 969, 973-75 (1986); Thomas, State
Annotation, supra note 85, § 4; Thomas, Federal Annotation, supra note 85, § 3.
91. Cf. United States v. Munchak, 338 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that the
duty of diligent inquiry is not suspended during appeal, especially where counsel has
been alerted to possibly significant facts), af/d, 460 F.2d 1407 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 915 (1972). The duty of diligence also demands, in some jurisdictions, that
the defendant make his motion promptly after discovering the evidence. See, e.g.,
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(g) (Consol. 1986).
92. Some courts and commentators speak in terms of "acquittal" instead of "differ-
ent result." See, e.g., Thomas, Federal Annotation, supra note 85, § 3, at 65. The
variance reflects confusion over whether the appropriate measure should be 12 jurors
or a hung jury. In real life, the distinction likely makes no difference. Wolf, supra
note 85, at 1933 n.28.
93. It is named after Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). For a
discussion of its criteria, see Case Comment, Criminal Procedure: Minnesota Adopts
the Larrison Standard for Granting a New Trial Because of Newly Discovered Evi-
dence: State v. Caldwell, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1314 (1983) [hereinafter Caldwell Case
Comment]; Repka, supra note 85, at 1439-40; Thomas, State Annotation, supra note
85, § 3; Soehnel, supra note 85, § 4. There are also hybrid versions of both the
Berry and Larrison standards. See Thomas, Federal Annotation, supra note 85, § 5.
Finally, the law in some places in unsettled. See Soehnel, supra note 85, § 5.
94. At least one state has extended the standard to nonperjurious mistaken testi-
mony. Caldwell Case Comment, supra note 93, at 1318 (treating State v. Caldwell,
322 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1982)).
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jurors' conclusion "might" have been altered.95 In addition, a
variation of Berry's due diligence requirement demands that the
movant either have been surprised by the perjury and unable to
meet it or have been unaware of its falsity until later. 6
Much ink has been spilled on such questions as which stan-
dard better balances the State's interests against the
defendant's 97 and whether claims of perjured testimony call for
distinctive treatment at all.98 They do not concern me here. For
present purposes, taking controlling law as a given, I wish to
highlight some difficulties routinely faced by those who would
use it to their advantage.
First, as mentioned, courts harbor a deep suspicion of this
type of motion, especially when it rests on a recantation. 99 That
95. Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87-88.
96. Larrison seems less strict than Berry in 'this regard. See Caldwell Case Com-
ment, supra note 93, at 1319-20.
97. Critics of the Larrison standard contend that its leniency regarding the likeli-
hood that the jury would have acted differently, absent the since-retracted perjury,
see supra text accompanying note 95, leads many courts to "violate it in application"
by concluding that the verdict would not have changed or failing to find that the
testimony at trial was false. United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); Caldwell Case Comment, supra note 93, at
1318-19; Wolf, supra note 85, at 1930-31. For this reason, it has lost ground in re-
cent years. See, e.g., United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1979) (declin-
ing to follow Larrison in a case of first impression); Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 246 (aban-
doning Larrison).
98. Compare, e.g., Wolf, supra note 85, at 1945-47 (arguing that a more lenient
test for false testimony cases is justified) with Ronald L. Carlson, False or Sup-
pressed Evidence: Why a Need for the Prosecutorial Tie?, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1171, 1186
n.42 ("Any such distinction appears irrational.") and Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d at 596-97
(Peterson, J., dissenting) (viewing the distinction as artificial). It should be stressed
that a prosecutor's knowing introduction or toleration of perjured evidence (not under
discussion now) amounts to constitutional error almost always warranting reversal.
See infra text accompanying note 236.
99. Repka, supra note 85, at 1434-35, 1440-47; see, e.g., United States ex rel.
Sostre v. Festa, 513 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.) (stating that traditionally, recantation
is regarded " 'with the utmost suspicion' ") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
841 (1975); People v. Shilitano, 112 N.E. 733, 736 (N.Y. 1916) ("There is no form of
proof so unreliable as recanting testimony."). For a differing opinion, see United
States v. Ramsey, 726 F.2d 601, 606 (10th Cir. 1984) (McKay, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The reasons for the mistrust include fear of defense manipu-
lation of the recanter "by duress, bribery, or misplaced sympathy," Repka, supra
note 85, at 1442 (footnote omitted), the witness' often close association with the de-
fendant, and the fact that recantations are sometimes withdrawn. See Cobb, supra
note 90, at 987-91; see, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 761 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1985)
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bias shades their view of defense witness' credibility, which
becomes a key issue when a former state's witness changes sides
and offers a revised account of relevant events that the prisoner
now tenders. While Herrera's affidavits did not contain repudia-
tions of prior testimony, others' submissions often do.00 Re-
gardless, however, no belatedly proffered evidence can help the
proponent unless the judge deems it at least potentially believ-
able, whether or not she, in fact, believes it.' 0 '
Beyond needing to overcome the general attitude of increduli-
ty, defendants who move for a new trial confront particular legal
obstacles that, for many, prove insurmountable. Rigid statutes of
limitation, as we have seen,0 2 may slam the door in the
applicant's face. Further, for those not barred at the outset,
Berry's probable-acquittal standard is hard to meet. 103 Admit-
tedly, the mere possibility of a changed outcome would apparent-
(finding the repudiated recantation to be false), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
The presumption against the reliability of such evidence also stems from prudential
concerns for finality and judicial economy. See Warren Lupel, Recanted Testimony:
Procedural Alternatives for Relief from Wrongful Imprisonment, 35 DEPAUL L. REV.
477, 478 (1985); Cobb, supra note 90, at 991-92; Repka, supra note 85, at 1443.
100. The recent release of an Alabama death row inmate, Walter McMillian, on
grounds of innocence hinged largely on such retractions. See Peter Applebome, Ala-
bama Releases Man Held on Death Row for Six Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1993, at
Al. McMillian, however, did not secure judicial relief on that accouni but rather
because of a violation of his Brady right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence. See
McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). After the defendant won
in court, the State acknowledged his lack of guilt and dismissed the charges. Inno-
cent Man Freed from Alabama's Death Row, 4 ALA. CAPITAL REP. 25 (1993). See also
Innocence and Execution, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1993, at A22 (noting that Randall
Dale Adams, chronicled in the movie The Thin Blue Line, had once come within
three days of execution but later was freed when the State's chief witness wholly
recanted).
101. The Larrison test expressly calls for the court to decide whether a material
witness lied. See supra text accompanying note 94. But Berry implicitly requires the
court to make a threshold determination of the credibility of the new evidence in
order to assess whether its introduction at a retrial would probably cause a better
outcome for the defendant. See Caldwell Case Comment, supra note 93, at 1324;
Cobb, supra note 90, at 978, 994 & n.120. In the context of recantations, some juris-
dictions explicitly add to the Berry criteria the need for a finding of credibility.
Thomas, State Annotation, supra note 85, at 1036 n.3; see, e.g., State v. Norman,
652 P.2d 683, 689 (Kan. 1982).
102. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
103. It is not, though, as preclusive as the rule of Jackson. See supra text accom-
panying notes 77-80.
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ly satisfy Larrison. But Larrison is a minority rule and applies
just to recantations. Significantly, too, the prevailing distrust of
turncoat witnesses has led courts to toughen this lenient test in
practice.10 4 Whatever the applicable standard, moreover, appel-
late courts will reverse denials of relief only for clear abuse of
discretion. 5
A major problem for prisoners seeking a second trial (above
all, capital inmates) stems from the "due diligence" requirement,
which constitutes one of the Berry criteria and surfaces in atten-
uated form in the Larrison standard.0 5 Together with the new-
ness element, common to both, it demands that the evidence in
question have been unknown and not reasonably discoverable at
the time of trial.0 7 Although powerful recent developments
like PCR-DNA testing have led to redress for some defen-
dants,0 8 applicants typically cannot rely on scientific innova-
104. See supra note 97. A few Berry jurisdictions, on their part, have liberalized
the rules in cases in which the victim or sole prosecution witness recants. See
Repka, supra note 85, at 1452-54; Thomas, State Annotation, supra note 85, § 9; see,
e.g., State v. Rolax, 529 P.2d 1078 (Wash. 1974) (holding that it was an abuse of
discretion to deny a new trial when the defendant was convicted only on the testi-
mony of the recanter). Further, insofar as courts make credibility determinations
pursuant to both Larrison and Berry, see supra note 101, the Berry approach is
better than the dominant Larrison approach for the defendant. The latter test, liter-
ally applied, considers the strength of the State's evidence without the peijury; the
former envisions the jury's having both versions of the story before it. Soehnel, su-
pra note 85, § 2. Thus, under Larrison, the judge evaluates the impact of the new
matter merely on the government's substantive proof, Wolf, supra note 85, at 1932-
33; under Berry, by contrast, she appraises its impeachment value as well. See Unit-
ed States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819
(1976).
105. See Cobb, supra note 90, at 979-80; see, e.g., United States v. Steel, 458 F.2d
1164, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 1972).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 91, 96. The ensuing remarks draw heavily
on Glenn, supra note 85.
107. See Glenn, supra note 85, § 2[a], at 21.
108. Two of these were Kirk Bloodsworth (imprisoned for murder and other crimes
and, at one stage, sentenced to death) and Tony Snyder, convicted of rape. In nei-
ther case, though, did the defendant obtain relief through a new trial motion. After
testing revealed their innocence, Bloodsworth persuaded the State's Attorney in Bal-
timore, Maryland to dismiss the charges against him and Snyder received executive
clemency from Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia. See Paul W. Valentine, Jailed
for Murder, Freed by DNA, WASH. POST, June 29, 1993, at Al, A12; Jim Dwyer,
Justice from a Lab Instead of a Court, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1993, at 2. See gen-
erally Innocence and Execution, supra note 100, at A22 (noting that proof of inno-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:943
tions. Rather, when proffering new experts, they tend to invoke
familiar techniques-for instance, fingerprint identifica-
tion-that often were used before by the State, in an effort to
present fresh results helpful to them. °9 Frequently, too,
movants produce solely non-scientific matter, as did
Herrera-for example, statements of purported witnesses to
relevant events, who may or may not have testified earlier,"
or records or other documentary items."'
Detailed treatment of the vagaries of the pertinent law is
beyond the purview of this Article. Indeed, it is unnecessary, my
aim being merely to make two points. One, except for genuine
novelties such as DNA testing,"' all of the usual kinds of evi-
dence submitted in support of new trial motions raise serious
issues in many cases of "oldness" or lack of due diligence. Two,
with regard to death-sentenced prisoners, the circumstances
characteristic of capital proceedings will only enlarge this stum-
bling block.
To exemplify my first contention, consider Herrera's situation.
Assuming the truth of his subsequent claim, he must have
known of his actual innocence."' Even if he thought it inadvis-
cence frequently arises outside the judicial system, such as when a newspaper runs
an investigative series or when 'a filmmaker takes an interest in a case).
109. See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 580-82 (Minn. 1982); see also
United States v. Keller, 145 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.J. 1956) (handwriting expert).
Caldwell presents a rare instance of the grant of a new trial based on the outcome
of later testing. Significantly, by then the State had already conceded that the rele-
vant print was not the defendant's. Caldwell Case Comment, supra note 93, at 1315.
110. See generally Glenn, supra note 85, §§ 16-28 (collecting cases).
111. See generally id. §§ 33-37 (collecting cases).
112. But cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 798 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Va.) (finding that the
habeas petitioner's late-presented PCR-DNA evidence only bolstered the verdict of
guilt), affd, 966 F.2d 1441 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2983 (1992). Truly
compelling proof may warrant dismissing the indictment rather than ordering a new
trial. See, e.g., supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the Bloodsworth
case). See generally Hon. Frederic S. Berman & Lainie R. Fastman, Newly Discov-
ered Evidence-A Defendant's Chance for a New-Trial, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 31, 47
(1983) (discussing when dismissal is warranted).
113. See United States v. Peters, 776 F. Supp. 365, 367-68 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("[The
defendant's] purpose in submitting the polygraph report is to proclaim his innocence,
a truth or falsity that was uniquely in [his] possession prior to trial."); see also
United States v. Capaldo, 276 F. Supp. 986 (D. Conn. 1967) (stating that if the
witness' testimony was false, the defendant knew so at the time of trial and had an
opportunity to meet it), affd, 402 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989
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able to take the stand,"4 why did he not produce at least his
brother and nephew as witnesses at trial?".. True, Raul
Herrera, Sr. (presumably guilty of the crime himself) might have
relied on his own privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion."6 Yet that possibility remained entirely speculative, in
the absence of any effort to call him." True as well, Raul Jr.
was still a child, but old enough to take the stand."' Simply
put, if guiltless, Herrera behaved in a manner strongly suggest-
ing a conscious strategy "not to come forward at trial and accuse
the [known] culprit.""' These facts predictably might have
(1969).
114. Courts have held that knowledge of the falseness of adverse testimony will not
prevent the defendant from obtaining a new trial, if he had no way to counter the
evidence without himself taking the stand. See, e.g., United States v. Flynn, 130 F.
Supp. "412 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955). But cf United States v.
Maestas, 523 F.2d 316, 320 (10th Cir. 1975) (expressing skepticism regarding the
defendant's claim that he could not have offered exculpatory evidence at trial, be-
cause such evidence could have come only from the complainant or from him-
self-thus forcing him to waive his privilege against self-incrimination). A defendant
who failed to testify at trial, however, cannot later proffer his own evidence in sup-
port of a new trial motion. See generally Glenn, supra note 85, § 24 (collecting cas-
es).
115. See, e.g., Peters, 776 F. Supp. at 367 (defendant could have produced at trial
two codefendants-one, his brother-who alleged afterward that they had never con-
spired with him). As a legal matter, Raul Sr.'s hearsay statements may have been
admissible as declarations against penal interest. See generally Munoz v. State, 435
S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (stating the test). But because Raul Sr.
ostensibly made the statements only after trial, they were unavailable in fact.
116. But cf Glenn, supra note 85, § 17[a], at 52 (noting that a witness' unwilling-
ness to testify at trial has been held not to excuse the defense's failure to call her).
117. The record, moreover, does not reveal any exploration prior to trial of Raul,
Sr.'s potential testimony. Hence, there exists no indication that the brother informal-
ly invoked the privilege. Even if he had, a court might not have excused the
defense's failure to call him. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 373 F.2d 17, 18
(5th Cir. 1967) (finding the defendant not entitled to a new trial on the basis of
testimony by a witness whose existence was known to defense counsel despite fact
that witness had stated he would refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimina-
tion).
118. Children of four and five had been found competent to testify in prosecutions
predating Herrera's. See Lujan v. State, 626 S.W.2d 854, 861 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981)
(citing cases).
119. See Berman & Fastman, supra note 112, at 43. Notably, too, he pleaded guilty
to the related Rucker murder. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993); id. at
872 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra note 49.
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doomed his quest for relief 2 even had he not fallen afoul of a
hard-and-fast untimeliness bar.
As respects my second contention, one can generalize that the
incompetence endemic to capital defense attorneys" will
haunt their clients in this post-conviction setting, as in oth-
ers'22-here, in the guise of a likely finding of lack of diligence
in producing evidence at trial." Also prevalent in death pen-
alty prosecutions, but not always detectable or provable, official
suppression of exculpatory matter" often reduces the "pool" of
120. See, e.g., People v. Padgett, 300 N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div. 1969) (defendant
made tactical decision not to call certain witnesses), affd, 265 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y.
1970). See generally Glenn, supra note 85, § 16 (collecting cases). To grant relief in
such a setting would encourage defendants to sandbag at trial, withholding testimo-
ny in their favor, secure in the knowledge that they could supply the omissions
later. See Strauss v. United States, 363 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 989 (1966). At oral argument, Justice Kennedy posed a hypothetical question
involving an accused who chooses to withhold proof of his innocence in order to
shield his brother, the murderer. He also inquired what would happen if the defen-
dant elects "not to testify at trial and then after conviction says his testimony will
show his innocence." In response, defense counsel implied that the inmate should
always be allowed to assert innocence as a bar to execution-leading Justice Souter
to comment that, under Herrera's proposed approach, a defendant might attack his
guilt without offering any new evidence. See Arguments Heard, supra note 10, at
3039-40. Doubtless, strategic considerations loomed large for other justices too.
121. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in
Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245, 251 (1990-1991) (arguing that
'conditions of capital defense work virtually guarantee ineffectiveness"); Ronald J.
Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death
Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 797, 801-10 (1986) (positing
that problems of inexperience, overwork, and inadequate funding lead to ineffective
representation).
122. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (holding that unless it falls
to the level of unconstitutional ineffectiveness, counsel's ignorance or mistake does
not amount to "cause" excusing state court procedural default in habeas proceedings).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 753 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Meier, 484 F. Supp. 1129, 1131-34 (D. Utah 1980). See generally Glenn,
supra note 85, § 9, at 37 ("[K]nowledge or diligence of defense counsel may be con-
sidered ... in determining whether the lack of knowledge and the diligence require-
ments have been met . . . ."). If counsel, moreover, belatedly learns of something
relevant of which the defendant was aware at trial, the latter's knowledge will doom
his motion. See, e.g., United States v. Blucher, 730 F. Supp. 428, 431 (S.D. Fla.
1990). See generally Glenn, supra note 85, § 9, at 37 (discussing the determination
of diligence by reference to "composite knowledge and actions" of counsel and client).
124. See Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and
Lack-of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 LoYOLA LA. L. REv. 59, 68 (1989);
Peter Applebome, On the Fast Track From the Courtroom to Death Row, N.Y. TIMES,
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evidence at the outset, thereby magnifying the role of a retrial
motion based on newly discovered evidence.'25 Finally, in order
to achieve success in the face of these problems, death-sentenced
prisoners desperately need professional help in mounting a post-
conviction proceeding. Such help is, all too often, lacking.'26
Despite these difficulties, however, such an action holds some
promise for meritorious Herrera claimants. Yet that promise can
be fulfilled only by abandoning fixed time limits'2 because, es-
Mar. 7, 1993, § 4, at 2. For an especially egregious instance of this phenomenon, see
McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
There, prosecutors failed to inform the defendant, an African American (later repre-
'sented by the author of this Article, among others), that the sole surviving victim
and witness initially had identified the killer as white. Similarly egregious
prosecutorial misconduct occurred in the criminal case underlying Amadeo v. Zant,
486 U.S. 214 (1988). In Amadeo, proof that the prosecutor had instructed jury com-
missioners to "stack" venires against minority and female jurors surfaced in a civil
case nine months later, while the petitioner's appeal was pending.
125. Several of the recent innocence cases involved successful Brady claims (al-
though these were not necessarily the direct cause of the prisoner's release). See,
e.g., supra note 100 (discussing the Walter McMillian case); Valentine, supra note
108, at A12 (reporting on the Kirk Bloodsworth case).
126. See Berger, supra note 5, at 1671. As I write, Congress is, once again, consid-
ering legislation that would furnish lawyers to represent these inmates in their state
collateral challenges. See, e.g., S. 1441, supra note 45, § 8. Federal law already pro-
vides counsel for indigents in habeas actions. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (1988). For a
discussion of previous bills on this subject, see JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 26 (Supp. 1992); Berger, supra note 5,
at 1705-07 & n.240.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (holding
that even though the prosecution conceded that the wrong man had been convicted,
Rule 33 relief was unavailable more than two years after judgment). Newspaper col-
umnist Jim Dwyer made the following pointed comment on the plight of Tony
Snyder, a convicted rapist who served seven years in prison before his release on
grounds of innocence:
In Virginia, where Tony Snyder was jailed, a convict has 21 days,
all of three weeks, to come up with new proof. It took genetic biologists,
starting with Mendel, 150 years to develop the DNA tests that proved
Snyder innocent.
Three weeks weren't quite enough for Tony Snyder.
Dwyer, supra note 108, at 2. As a less restrictive alternative to a statute of limita-
tions, the State might impose an obligation to act promptly after the discovery of
new evidence. See Cobb, supra note 90, at 971. Such an approach, if substituted for
the usual due diligence requirements, would also alleviate the other major technical
obstacle to victory on this type of motion. Compare the requirements of the State of
New York, supra note 91 (demanding both initial diligence and prompt filing) with
those of the federal government. Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
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pecially in capital cases, proof of innocence tends to surface
years after final judgment, if at all.128 Further development of
this subject must await the end of this Article. Meanwhile, I
move to the topic of clemency-the last hope of convicted inno-
cents and scoundrels alike.
2. Clemency 9
Typically, the Governor exercises the power of executive clem-
ency alone."'0 In a number of states, she shares it with an ad-
ministrative board. 131  In a handful, the latter (usually,
gubernatorially appointed) has the prime decisionmaking
role.1 2 Unlike the motion for a new trial (indeed, unlike any
Cases in the United States District Courts states that a habeas petition may be
dismissed if delay in its filing prejudiced the State in its ability to respond to the
petition, "unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could
not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circum-
stances prejudicial to the state occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
128. See Eric M. Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital Jury: Two Leg-
islative Proposals for Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death Penalty
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 316 (1990-1991). Often, a prisoner on
death row first obtains a qualified lawyer long after conviction and sentence. See,
e.g., Blaustein, supra note 34, at C1 (noting that Gary Grahams new attorneys,
including "veteran capital defender" Richard Burr, are attempting to prove the
client's innocence). See generally Freedman, supra, at 316 n.7 (stating that the "in-
sufficiency of legal resources results in a system of triage," with the best attorneys
focusing their efforts on inmates closest to execution).
129. In addition to full or conditional pardons, the term "clemency" covers commu-
tations and remissions of fines as well as reprieves. For a thorough treatment of its
nature and history, extending beyond the scope of this Article, see generally Kobil,
supra note 81. Other sources relied on in the ensuing pages include: Hugo A. Bedau,
The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 255 (1990-1991); Bilionis, supra note 37, at 1696-701 (1993); Tabak, supra
note 121, at 844-46; Stuart Lichten, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases (undated,
unpublished manuscript on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
130. Kobil, supra note 81, at 605. Most of the 29 states adhering to this model
have established advisory panels that make nonbinding recommendations to the chief
executive. Id.
131. Id. (16 states, at present). In Texas, the Governor and the Board of Pardons
and Paroles divide authority over clemency. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11 (establish-
ing Board of Pardons and Paroles); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 48.01 (West
1979) (authorizing the Governor to grant reprieves, commutations of punishment,
and pardons on the recommendation and advice of the Board of Pardons and Pa-
roles).
132. Kobil, supra note 81, at 605 (five states, at present).
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other judicial form of action), executive clemency is not encum-
bered by diligence requirements, burdens of proof, limitations
periods, or similar obstacles to relief.'33 Only a very few
jurisdictions-none of them major capital states-have issued
any substantive standards to guide the critical determina-
tion.14 Thus, not surprisingly, this resort for death-sentenced
prisoners possesses the defects of its virtues: notably, a lack of
guaranteed- procedural safeguards3 5 and, given the degree of
discretion, a risk of arbitrary denial.3 6
These structural flaws in the process pale considerably, how-
ever, in light of the single crucial fact that clemency has almost
ceased to exist for death row inmates in recent years.'37 Its
133. See Bilionis, supra note 37, at 1699-700. But cf infra note 135 (discussing
Texas procedural guidelines for entertaining pardon requests grounded on innocence).
134. Professor Kobil lists only Colorado, Minnesota, Washington, and Missouri. See
Kobil, supra note 81, at 605 & n.235.
135. See Note, supra note 84, at 891, 900-01. Some procedures may severely ham-
per the prisoner. In Texas, for instance, the Board of Pardons and Paroles will hear
applications based on innocence only if the defendant tenders:
(1) a written unanimous recommendation of the current trial officials
of the court of conviction; and/or
(2) a certified order or judgment of a court having jurisdiction ac-
companied by certified copy of the findings of fact (if any); and
(3) affidavits of witnesses upon which the finding of innocence is
based.
TEX. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 37, § 143.2 (West Supp. 1992). These requirements, if unmet,
operate as a substantive bar.
136. See generally George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 269, 279 (noting that one definition of
"discretion" is "the power to get away with alternative decisions"). The election to
grant or withhold clemency is not reviewable in the courts. Note, supra note 84, at
893-95.
137. See Bedau, supra note 129; Tabak, supra note 121, at 844-46. In" the words of
Professor Bilionis: "[T]he prevailing wisdom holds that clemency in death cases en-
tered a nosedive at roughly the same moment that judicial regulation of capital
punishment under the Eighth Amendment skyrocketed." Bilionis, supra note 37, at
1697 (footnote omitted). To the same effect, see also Lichten, supra note 129, at 5
('as the pace of executions has quickened in recent years the number of commuta-
tions has declined"); cf. Kobil, supra note 81, at 602-04 (treating "atrophy" of federal
clemency power). Interestingly, in the early 1980's, Texas accounted for 33 out of 38
death row commutations, with Florida making up the rest. See Clearinghouse on
Georgia Prisons and Jails, List of Commutations Since 1976 (Jan. 21, 1987) (reprint-
ed as unpaginated last page in Lichten, supra note 129). Yet, as a recent study
points out, the 30 commutations between 1981 and 1983 were mass commutations
granted in order to avoid retrials otherwise required because of two new Court deci-
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current desuetude sharply diverges from practice earlier in the
century; until about a decade ago, commutations were not infre-
quent.138 Because uncertainty about guilt presents the stron-
gest ground for redress,139 the rare exceptions to the de facto
abolition of clemency have tended to involve such lingering
doubts.14° But in the post-Herrera world, in which the execu-
tive branch often will furnish the sole available forum for evalu-
ating newly discovered evidence, one cannot count on mercy to
function as a reliable proxy for justice. To the contrary, without
legislative correction (or a judicial change of heart), we shall
probably witness the execution of an innocent person by the end
of the 1990's.'
The reason for this conclusion is plain and needs no lengthy
elaboration. Simply put, by a journalist critical of Herrera: "In
relegating the fates of convicted state prisoners to discretionary
acts of gubernatorial grace, the Supreme Court has thrown the
sions. Since 1983, Texas has granted relief only five times, and not once since 1990.
Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capi-
tal Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 289, 295-96 (1993). Syndicated columnist Molly Ivins
has written about the current "nonexistent clemency procedure theoretically in the
hands of the Board of Pardons and Paroles." Molly Ivins, Spare Gary Graham,
WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1993, at A21. According to Ivins, "[tlhe 18 board members are
scattered all over the state, no one is in charge of calling them together in emergen-
cies, they have no rules on how to proceed, and the board is traditionally composed
of retired law-enforcement officers who think it's not their job to second-guess the
courts." Id.
138. See Lichten, supra note 129, at 1-5. See generally Note, supra note 84, at 895-
96 (providing an overview of clemency in Anglo-American tradition).
139. For an early assertion that pardon is especially appropriate in those circum-
stances, see Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310 (1855). See also Kobil, supra
note 81, at 612-13 (arguing that ideally clemency should serve as a useful safety
valve for the wrongly convicted). But cf. Henry Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon, 88
U. PA. L. REv. 177, 192 (1939) ("To pardon a man for being innocent is irony.").
140. See, e.g., Bilionis, supra note 37, at 1700-01 & n.246 (discussing the commuta-
tions of death sentences of Herbert R. Bassette, Jr. and Joseph Giarratano in Vir-
ginia, and Anson Avery Maynard in North Carolina); Freedman, supra note 128, at
319 n.22 (discussing the commutation of Ronald Monroe in Louisiana); see also
Tabak, supra note 121, at 845 (stating that now the Georgia Board of Pardons and
Paroles will not consider clemency unless there is doubt concerning guilt).
141. The relevant "witnessing" would, of course, come after the fact, when positive
proof of innocence emerged. See generally Mark V. Tushnet, The Politics of Executing
the Innocent: The Death Penalty in the Next Century?, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 261
(1991) (expounding the view that the Court's toleration of serious defects in capital
proceedings will insure such a miscarriage of justice).
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fundamental question of guilt or innocence straight into the
lion's den of partisan politics." 42 While courts (especially elect-
ed judges) hardly are immune from political pressure,' they
operate under procedural constraints and issue written, review-
able decisions. Even the most biased must pay lip service to a
professional norm of neutrality. Governors, on their part, insti-
tutionally fill the role of commanders-in-chief of the prosecu-
tion.'" People do not expect dispassion from the executive but,
rather, responsiveness to their will.
These days, perhaps always, the public cries for law-and-or-
der. Scared to be dubbed" 'bleeding heart[s]'" or " 'fuzzy-think-
ing do-gooder[s],' " all but the very boldest leaders follow the
path of least resistance' 45-- in this context, as in others. They
just say no.4 ' Thus, for most Herrera claimants, clemency is
truly a " 'gateway to nowhere.' 14
142. Comment, Wrongful Death, NEW YORKER, Aug. 16, 1993, at 4, 6; see Kobil,
supra note 81, at 607-10; Tabak, supra note 121, at 845-46.
143. See Berger, supra note 37, at 1085-86 n.107; Tabak, supra note 121, at 846-
47.
144. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986) (plurality opinion).
145. Kobil, supra note 81, at 607-09 (quoting MICHAEL DISALLE, THE POWER OF
LIFE OR DEATH 204 (1965)). As a rule, there is no reason to believe that administra-
tive boards or panels with power over the clemency decision possess more courage or
independence than the chief executives who appoint them. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 131-32.
146. Some Governors and their surrogates mouth pieties about not wanting to in-
terfere with determinations by courts or juries. See Tabak, supra note 121, at 845;
Ivins, supra note 137, at A21. That rationale, or rationalization, for executive inertia
destroys the whole meaning of clemency-a deliberately extrajudicial process for
taking a final, and fresh, look at the prisoner's case. Others, more honest, admit
their capitulation to political pressure. See Kobil, supra note 81, at 608 (quoting
EDM UND BROWN & DICK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE AND PRIVATE MERCY 78-79, 84
(1989)).
147. Marcia Coyle, Inmate Granted Unique Hearing, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 1993, at
3, 42 (quoting the author of this Article). On that account, some who seek to revital-
ize pardon and commutation propose to subject the process to legal, or even consti-
tutional, constraints. See, e.g., Bilionis, supra note 37, at 1698-701 (arguing that
meaningful clemency review is the Governor's constitutional duty); Daniel T. Kobil,
Due Process in Death Penalty Commutations: Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Clemency, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 201 (1993) (contending that procedural due process
protections should be extended to clemency process in capital cases); Kobil, supra
note 81, at 624-33 (noting that an applicant would have a right to clemency in cer-
tain situations, including cases where there is "substantial doubt of guilt").
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C. Federal Law: Death and Innocence, Innocence and Habeas
1. Is Death Different?'48
Well before Furman v, Georgia149  and the Gregg v.
Georgia50 quintet15 ushered in the modern era of death pen-
alty jurisprudence, the Court displayed a heightened concern for
capital defendants. In several settings, the Justices either enun-
ciated special rules 52 or applied the usual rules with special
bite"'53 to insure procedural regularity in cases involving con-
In August 1993, a district judge in Austin, Texas ordered that the Board of
Pardons and Paroles hear death row inmate Gary Graham's compelling new evidence
of innocence. He rested his decision on the " 'due course of law' " protection of the
state constitution, a right analogous to federal due process. Coyle, supra, at 3 (quot-
ing District Judge Pete Lowry of Travis County, Texas). The Attorney General took
an appeal, which automatically vacated the lower court order. New Twists in Case of
a Texan Scheduled to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1993, at B7. As I write, the litiga-
tion is still pending.
148. In this Section, which implicates a voluminous literature, the sources upon
which I have relied include Berger, supra note 37; Vivian Berger, Born-Again Death,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1987) (book review); Bilionis, supra note 37; Markus D.
Dubber, Regulating the Tender Heart When the Axe Is Ready to Strike, 41 BUFF. L.
REV. 85 (1993); and Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305.
Analysis of the doctrinal developments noted here exceeds the scope of the present
Article. Fuller treatments appear in the articles cited above.
149. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
150. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
151. Gregg's four companion cases were Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (up-
holding Florida's death penalty statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (up-
holding Texas' death penalty statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (invalidating North Carolina's death penalty statute); and Roberts (Stanislaus)
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating Louisiana's death penalty statute).
152. For example, before Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), required pro-
vision of counsel to felony defendants in every case, the Court laid down a per se
rule calling for appointment of counsel for indigents in capital proceedings. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see generally Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S.
375, 391 (1955) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The difference between capital and non-capital
offenses is the basis of differentiation in law in diverse ways in which the distinc-
tion becomes relevant.") (footnote omitted).
153. For example, the Court would give unusually intensive scrutiny to the facts
bearing on the voluntariness of confessions admitted in capital cases. See Paul M.
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 516 (1963); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 229, 272 (1985); see, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Cf Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 87 (1935) (applying similar scrutiny where capitally
sentenced defendant alleged grand jury discrimination).
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demned prisoners." That approach was scarcely startling, giv-
en the obvious harshness and irrevocability of execution; the
"qualitative difference" between death and other penalties de-
manded "a corresponding difference in the need for reliability" in
the capital sentencing process.'55 But only in the decade after
Furman did the Court systematically mine the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishments Clause, invoking the "death is different"
mantra to institute unique protections for capital trials' and
to extend certain guilt-phase protections to sentencing hear-
ings.157
Recent years plainly have seen a weakening in the commit-
ment to the difference principle. To be sure, the basic Eighth
Amendment edifice built in the 1970's '5 remains in place,'59
with its requirements of (minimally) non-arbitrary sentenc-
ing, '6  individualization of punishment, narrowing of the
154. The Court also has revealed more of a disposition to police the "outposts . ..
of... substantive criminal law" in this setting than in others. See Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 228 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Martin v. Ohio,
480 U.S. 228, 232 (1987) (noting "preeminent role" of states in defining criminal
conduct); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) ("The States possess primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."); Sundby, supra note 70, at
477 (remarking on the Court's extreme reluctance to impose controls in area of state
criminal law). Thus, for instance, while the Eighth Amendment contains only a nar-
row proportionality principle applicable to ordinary sentencing, Harmelin v. Michigan,
111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring), that principle has broader appli-
cation in the review of sentences of death. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982) (holding that a death sentence is an excessive penalty for one who nei-
ther killed nor attempted or intended to kill) (modified in Tisen v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987)); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that a death sentence is
an excessive penalty for the rape of an adult woman).
155. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305; see Dubber, supra note 148, at 119-20.
156. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (prohibiting a definition of
statutory aggravating circumstance so broad that it fails to guide the sentencer's
discretion); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (disallowing application of an other-
wise valid hearsay rule in a way that excludes from consideration the defendant's
trustworthy mitigating evidence).
157. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (privilege against self-incrim-
ination); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981) (double jeopardy).
158. See Berger, supra note 37, at 1070-74; Berger, supra note 148, at 1303.
159. See generally Bilionis, supra note 37, at 1659. The Justices, except for Scalia
and Thomas, adhere to the central modern tenets that capital sentencing determina-
tions "should aspire toward moral appropriateness, should be reached in a rational
and orderly fashion, and should be rendered with.., heightened procedural fair-
ness." Id.
160. See Berger, supra note 37, at 1074-77 (stating that the Court has "virtually
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death-eligible class by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of at
least a single aggravating factor,'6 ' virtually unlimited admis-
sibility and mandatory consideration of the defendant's mitigat-
ing proof"s2 and lastly, meaningful appellate review." Nowa-
days, though, death's practical distinction from other penalties
makes less of a legal difference." Insofar as it does matter, as
commentators both on and off the Court have noted, it increas-
ingly cuts against, not for, the capital defendant.'65
The overall retrenchment in this area does not, of course,
amount to precedent regarding any specific contention. Knowing
of the trend toward taking claims of death-sentenced prisoners
less seriously, one could have generally predicted the likely
demise of Herrera's-or another inmate's-claim without having
abandoned" its objective of curbing capricious sentencing).
161. Such narrowing, however, may occur at the guilt trial rather than at the pen-
alty hearing. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
162. However, "[s]tates are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating
evidence 'in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the
death penalty,' " Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990) (quoting Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 (1988) (plurality opinion)); accord Johnson v. Texas, 113
S. Ct. 2658 (1993), and aggravating proof is also admissible almost without consti-
tutional constraint. Compare Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (prosecution
may adduce victim impact evidence) with Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983)
(prosecution may not employ "constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant"
aggravating factors).
163. See Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731, 739 (1991).
164. See, e.g., Dubber, supra note 148, at 145 ("[D]eath was not different enough to
protect capital defendants against anti-sympathy instructions . . . or against victim
impact statements" in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), and Payne, respectively.);
see also Berger, supra note 37, at 1074-83. Professor Weisberg correctly views the
Court's October 1982 Term as a turning point for death row inmates. During that
term, an almost unbroken string of victories gave way to a growing number of de-
feats. See Weisberg, supra note 148; see also WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY
IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
12-13 (1987) (noting that, previously, the Court had overturned the death sentence
in all-but one of the fully argued capital cases).
165. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 347 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ("The Court today seems to give a new meaning to our recognition that death
is different."); Weisberg, supra note 148, at 343-44 (discussing Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880 (1983)). Sometimes the principle is used, as it were, in reverse-to
restrict non-capital defendants' rights. Thus, for example, in Harmelin v. Michigan,
111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991), the Court "limited the Eighth Amendment's requirement of
individualized sentencing to capital cases on the basis of 'the qualitative difference
between death and other penalties.' " Dubber, supra note 148, at 145 (quoting
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2702).
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identified a precise contraindication. Even in the 1990's, capital
defendants win at times.'66 Closer analysis, however, reveals
several factors militating against success for the present peti-
tioner in particular.
First, Herrera's proposed rule that he must be given a "mean-
ingful post-trial opportunity" to. prove his innocence... was tru-
ly new. Defendants, not surprisingly, tend to prevail more often
with somewhat more familiar arguments.'68 Second, he in-
voked broad concepts of substantive and procedural justice with
ill-defined and potentially expansive applications. For example,
at oral argument, despite counsel's disavowal, members of the
Court evinced concern that a decision favoring Herrera would
"extend to all inmates, not just inmates sentenced to death."'69
By contrast, especially in recent times, the defense stands a
better chance of carrying the day on a narrower claim. 7 '
Third, although the Court announced many safeguards for pen-
alty hearings that find no counterpart in regular sentenc-
ing"'--to insure the utmost reliability in life-or-death determi-
166. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, Ax Poised- Over Habeas, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 31, 1992, at
S10 (describing the fairly good record of capital litigants in the Court's October 1991
Term). Notably, the victories clustered in the direct, as opposed to habeas, docket.
See id.
167. See supra text accompanying note 23.
168. See, e.g., Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992) (holding that irrelevant
penalty hearing proof of a defendant's membership in white racist prison gang vio-
lated the First Amendment); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (holding
in favor of a defendant compelled by its earlier decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367 (1988), barring requirement that the jury be unanimous in finding a specif-
ic mitigating circumstance, as a prerequisite to its weighing by an individual juror).
169. Marcia Coyle, Debate on Death Appeals Starts Court Year, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 19,
1992, at 5; Arguments Heard, supra note 10, at 3040; see supra text accompanying
notes 13-14, and note 26 and accompanying text; cf Dubber, supra note 148, at 144
("While death's unique quality once permitted the Court to grant capital defendants
constitutional protections not available to other defendants, it has been transformed
into a method for restricting the constitutional rights of capital and non-capital de-
fendants alike.") (footnote omitted).
170. See, e.g., Trevino v. Texas, 112 S. Ct. 1547 (1992) (finding that a defendant
whose trial preceded Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), sufficiently preserved
an objection that the State violated equal protection in its use of peremptory strikes
in his case); Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991) (holding that a penalty hear-
ing did not comport with due process where the defense lacked adequate notice that
the judge might sentence the defendant to death).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 158-62.
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nations-even in the heyday of post-Furman doctrinal develop-
ment, it did almost nothing distinctive to enhance procedures
during the guilt phase.'72 That background furnished no
ground to anticipate a hospitable reception for a death-sentenced
prisoner's assertion of a post-trial right to establish innocence.
Plainly, accurate verdicts of guilt are a sine qua non of accu-
rate sentences-they comprise the principal bulwark against
erroneous executions. Because most capital defendants enjoy no
greater protection than any other defendants from the risk of
wrongful conviction,' one cannot assess their vulnerability in
this respect without generally evaluating the truth-determining
process at trial. While such an exhaustive examination falls
outside my present compass, I note my view that a real-world
system could give, consistent with government interests in vindi-
cating the criminal law, more assurance of safeguarding inno-
cents than does ours.'74 Be that as it may, nothing in the juris-
172. The major exception that comes to mind, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625
(1980), held that a jury in a capital case must be permitted to consider a lesser
included offense supported by the record. The Court had never found a defendant
entitled, as a matter of due process, to such a charge in a non-death setting. Id. at
637. Beck was limited a decade later to situations where the absence of a lesser
offense instruction would leave the jury with no option but to convict of a capital
crime or else set the defendant free. Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2505 (1991).
In addition, certain jury selection rules meant to ensure the retention of jurors who
can follow the judge's instructions also may help capital defendants during the guilt
phase of the proceeding. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992) (holding
the defense entitled to challenge for cause any prospective juror who would always
vote for death if the defendant was convicted of a capital offense); Turner v. Murray,
476 U.S. 28 (1986) (allowing a defendant accused of interracial capital crime to con-
duct voir dire on the issue of possible racial bias). The most significant jury selec-
tion rule, however--"death qualification" pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968)-may harm such defendants by eliminating venirepersons less likely
to return convictions. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168-73 (1986)
(discussing the numerous social science studies which conclude that "death qualifica-
tion" produces "conviction-prone" juries).
173. Indeed, they may fare worse than ordinary defendants in certain ways. See,
e.g., supra text accompanying notes 121-25 (discussing the prevalent incompetence of
counsel and the suppression of evidence in capital trials); cf Darden v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 168 (1985) (tolerating extreme misconduct in the State's summation at the
end of the guilt phase). But cf supra note 172 (noting that in certain guilt trials,
some precedent gives heightened protection).
174. Professor Stacy has mounted a persuasive case that the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, while touting accuracy "Uber alles," have sought solely to reduce the total
number of errors rather than, as has traditionally been the goal, the incidence of
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prudence of difference beyond its value as a catchphrase should
have provided much hope to Herrera.
2. Is Innocence Paramount?'
75
Sensibly, what did encourage the petitioner was the increas-
ing focus on innocence as a foundational reference point of mod-
em habeas corpus doctrine.76 In a context of drastic retrench-
ment beginning in the 1970's, 7 7 the majority Justices have
placed the value of shielding the guiltless at the core of the
shrinking writ.78 Although "what constitutes innocence" may
mistaken convictions. See Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUMf. L. REV. 1369 (1991). To similar effect, see Note,
Winship on Rough Waters: The Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1993).
175. The habeas literature is, if possible, even vaster than the capital punishment
scholarship. With regard to this section, useful sources, old and new, include the
following: Bator, supra note 153; Berger, supra note 5; Robert M. Cover & T. Alex-
ander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035 (1977); Dubber, supra note 148, at 92-98; Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrel-
evant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970);
Bruce Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 415 (1990-1991); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The
Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 CoLUM. L. REv.
1997 (1992) [hereinafter Liebman, Apocalypse]; LIEBMAN, supra note 126 (1988 &
Supp. 1992); James S. Liebman, More Than 'Slightly Retro": The Rehnquist Court's
Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 537 (1990-1991) [hereinafter Liebman, "Slightly Retro"]; Daniel J. Meltzer,
State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1128 (1986); Kathleen
Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (1991); Weisberg, supra note 148;
and Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993).
176. See Brief for Petitioner at 36-38, Herrera (No. 91-7328).
177. For explorations of these trends in greater depth than is feasible here, see
generally the sources cited supra note 175. Among other things, the Court has con-
structed a virtually airtight system of forfeitures that serves to deny habeas review
to defendants who have made procedural missteps either in state court or in pre-
vious federal proceedings. See infra text accompanying notes 205-25. It also has
fashioned a novel and sweeping law of prospectivity of new rulings favoring defen-
dants, see supra note 41 and infra text accompanying notes 198-201, refused to ap-
ply the strict constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18 (1967), in habeas actions, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993),
and (again departing from the difference principle), declined to afford heightened
review to claims of death-sentenced habeas petitioners. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 853, 863 (1993) (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (plu-
rality opinion)). Indeed, in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court actu-
ally endorsed more cursory treatment for capital claimants.
178. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
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sometimes prove a difficult question, 7 ' the Court, as I explain
below, has settled mainly on a layperson's notion of this phe-
nomenon. Herrera's latter-day effort to shunt the blame to his
brother surely fell within that heading.8 0 Thus, paradoxically,
he envisioned using the Court's restrictive precedents to broaden
the path to relief for himself.
The significance of the concept of innocence in habeas law has
been growing for approximately twenty years. Championed
heavily by several influential jurists, both on and off the Court
(most prominently, Judge Friendly,'' late of the Second Cir-
ing) (majority sets aside the "question whether constitutional rights have been pre-
served and considers only the petitioner's innocence or guilt"); see also Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing cases). Justice Stevens was
contrasting the majority's approach in Smith with the usual view of the writ's func-
tion, expressed succinctly by Justice Holmes: "[W]hat we have to deal with [on habe-
as review] is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether
their constitutional rights have been preserved." Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-
88 (1923). Even Justice Powell, who became one of the chief proponents of an inno-
cence-centered writ, see infra text accompanying note 182, initially conceded, "I am
aware that history reveals no exact tie of the writ of habeas corpus to a constitu-
tional claim relating to innocence or guilt." Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 257 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
179. See Sundby, supra note 70, at 458. For example, innocence in a legal sense
may coexist with factual guilt, as when wholly reliable evidence, seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, must be suppressed and, in its absence, the record will
not support conviction. (This would hold true by definition for possessory crimes.)
See Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New
Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 9, 93 n.440 (1986). Rulings that the
defendant's conduct did not fall within the proscription of the law under which he
was charged, see, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), or that the
prosecution was brought under an unconstitutional statute, see, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), may present complex issues of characterization that
blur the line between factual innocence and legal innocence, especially when the
activity in question violates some other law. See id. at 2541 & n.1 (cross burning on
another's property). So, too, in a different vein, do cases involving mental states
such as insanity, in which a verdict of not guilty tends, in practice, to mask a blend
of laypersons', lawyers', and medical concepts. In addition, a court concerned with
innocence may focus on the status of the particular defendant as a guilty or inno-
cent person, on the type of claim she raises, or on a combination of both. See 1
LEIBMAN, supra note 126, § 2.2, at 20 n.83 (1988); infra text accompanying notes
188-90. Finally, for a discussion of "innocence of death" in the capital sentencing
context, see infra note 213.
180. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2519-20 (1992) (discussing "[a]
prototypical example of 'actual innocence' "-i.e., where a person other than the con-
victed defendant confesses to the crime).
181. Together with Professor Bator, see supra note 153, Judge Friendly provided
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cult, and Justice Powell82), the theme of "[un]deserved confine-
ment"8 ' or moral worthiness'" as a touchstone for the reme-
dy has played out, with variations, in four main doctrinal set-
tings. These involve limitations on the scope of federal review of
certain kinds of subject matter, of repetitive applications, and of
contentions procedurally defaulted in the state courts or relying
on new rules announced since the judgment became final. In all
these areas, a majority of' Justices have inveighed against the
systemic costs of habeas, especially its incursions upon finality,
comity, and federalism.'85 Increasingly, only the possibility of
overturning inaccurate judgments has been deemed a sufficient
benefit to justify the perceived "expense."
I do not intend to replough this much-tilled ground in any
depth in the following pages.8 6 For present needs, it suffices to
the philosophical groundwork for the "New Habeas." Patchel, supra note 175, at 943.
In his widely quoted article, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, he proposed that, "with a few important exceptions," collateral relief for
both state and federal prisoners should lie only when the petitioner "supplements his
constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence." Friendly, supra note 175, at
142; see also id. at 160, 167. Another preeminent law review piece of the 1970's that
explored the potential for habeas of a jurisprudence of innocence was Dialectical
Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, supra note 175, written by Professors
Cover and Aleinikoff. Unlike the earlier Friendly work, it appeared to imply expan-
sion, not contraction, of the writ's reach. "At its outer limit, the suggested principle
may create a federal constitutional right to a correct verdict." Id. at 1099; see also
id. at 1087, 1095-100. Predictably, given the Court's ideological complexion, this
article has not shaped the discourse outside academia.
182. See, e.g., Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-75 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Black also contributed to this trend. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Unit-
ed States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (Black, J., dissenting).
183. See Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. at 257 (Powell, J., concurring).
184. Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498-99 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.) ("For surely
it is an abuse to deal too casually and too lightly with rights guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution, even though they involve limitations on State power and may
be invoked by the morally unworthy.") (emphasis added).
185. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1468-69 (1991); Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1989) (plurality opinion); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-28
& nn.31-32 (1982) (quoting, inter alia, Friendly, supra note 175, at 145, 146; Bator,
supra note 153, at 452); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976).
186. Professor Bator's approach to narrowing collateral relief, contained in a path-
breaking law review article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, supra note 153, is, however, worthy of mention. Even more
mooted than Judge Friendly's, see generally Liebman, Apocalypse, supra note 175, at
2041, it has competed with his for dominance as a theoretical basis for restricting
habeas corpus. Unlike the latter, which sees the writ's central function as correcting
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identify what Herrera's team would have observed in the legal
landscape of the 1990's... of conceivable aid to them.
Essentially, the jurisprudence of innocence has evolved along
two lines, distinct but related, in this context. One is "categori-
cally focused" on constitutional violations that, irrespective of
their effect on the individual defendant, tend to subvert reliable
determinations of guilt in the general run of cases." The other
looks to the status of the specific defendant: whether, regardless
of the type of error urged, she might be innocent.'89 A tougher
variant of the latter blends it partly with the former, restricting
relief to instances in which the alleged breach may have result-
ed in the conviction of this petitioner, despite her innocence.'
The first approach initially emerged in a number of opinions
suggesting that post-conviction review should not encompass
complaints of unlawful search and seizure, whose vindication
obstructs the truthfinding function of trials.'9 ' That view pre-
erroneous results, Professor Bator's article regards habeas as an insurer of satisfacto-
ry process for deciding federal questions in cases in which the state courts have not
afforded adequate review at some point in the proceedings. "It is, after all, the es-
sence of the responsibility of the states under the due process clause to furnish a
criminal defendant with a full and fair opportunity to make his defense and litigate
his case . . . ." Bator, supra note 153, at 456. Absent such a failure of process or a
lack of jurisdiction in the trial court, Bator would deny a federal forum. See id& at
455-62. Although Judge Friendly's article acknowledges his heavy debt to the Bator
piece, their implications are very different and often at odds. But as Professor
Patchel has shown, both have influenced recent case law (at times, conjoining in a
single decision, see, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); infra note 192 and
accompanying text) because of their mutual ability to further the agenda of cutting
back on habeas. See Patchel, supra note 175, at 953-58 & n.85, 961; id. (passim); see
also Friendly, supra note 175, at 146 n.15. For a summary listing of several models
of habeas review, see Woolhandler, supra note 175, at 576-80.
187. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
188. See 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 2.2, at 20 n.83 (1988).
189. See id. For instance, under this approach, a defendant might offer evidence of
innocence along with a claim of a breach of her constitutional right to a speedy
trial, which has little or nothing to do with guilt or innocence.
190. See id. For example, a defendant might urge that admission of an unconstitu-
tionally suggestive pretrial identification procedure at her trial caused an erroneous
verdict of guilt. Here, as opposed to the previous example, see supra note 189, the
nature of the error (guilt related) and the status of the defendant (innocent) are
connected.
191. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 302 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-75 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring);
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 231 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
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vailed in 1976 in Stone v. Powell.'92 Justice Powell, writing for
the Court, emphasized that exempting this class of claims from
habeas created no danger of denying a safeguard against com-
pelling an innocent man to lose his liberty.' Assailed by
scholars," Stone has not, however, proved the harbinger of a
piecemeal evisceration of habeas, as feared by dissenting Justice
Brennan,'95 nor even of a prudential limitation of the writ to
petitioners with innocence-connected claims.'96 Instead, the
Court has repeatedly rebuffed attempts to extend it beyond the
Fourth Amendment domain. 197
192. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In an amalgam of innocence and process considerations,
the Court held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a
state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence
obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial." Id.
at 482.
193. Id. at 491 n.31. "Rather, a convicted defendant who pressed a search and sei-
zure claim on collateral attack was 'usually asking society to redetermine an issue
that ha[d] no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration.' " Kuhlmann v. Wil-
son, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 492
n.31).
194. See, e.g., Patchel, supra note 175, at 959-65; Ira P. Robbins & James E. Sand-
ers, Judicial Integrity, the Appearance of Justice, and the Great Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus: How to Kill Two Thirds (or More) with One Stone, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 63
(1977); Yale L. Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus: From Great Writ to
Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597, 598-610 (1985). But cf Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 175, at 1086-100 (considering the implications of Stone in
more positive terms).
195. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. See id.; cf Robbins & Sanders, supra note 194, at 85 (predicting that the posi-
tion "that federal habeas corpus relief should be available only to those who present
a colorable claim of innocence may be only a Stone's throw away") (footnote omitted).
Before Stone, Professor Mishkin had recommended limiting habeas relief to claims
that affect the "guilt determining process." See Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High
Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56,
79-86, 102 (1965).
197. See Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993) (declining to "Stone" viola-
tions of Miranda); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (refusing to bar
habeas for claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, grounded in failure to challenge
search and seizure on Fourth Amendment grounds); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307 (1979) (holding that Stone does not bar claims of constitutionally deficient evi-
dence); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (allowing the issue of racial discrimina-
tion in selection of grand jury foreman to be raised in habeas). Although the issue
in Jackson, for instance, did bear directly on " 'the basic question of guilt or inno-
cence,' " see Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1750 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323), in
Rose, it surely did not. The accused had been convicted at trial by a properly chosen
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More recently, the Court included a categorical innocence
exception1 98 to its general bar, announced in the landmark
Teague v. Lane, 99 on announcing or applying new rules of
criminal procedure in habeas corpus. 00 This narrow proviso
allowed for retroactivity of certain "watershed rules;" specifical-
ly, "those new procedures without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction is seriously diminished.""' While Stone's
ultimately failed blueprint implied whittling away at habeas,
Teague's highly successful strategy has cut the remedy down
with an ax.2"2 Yet, from the petitioner's perspective, both theo-
petit jury. Cf Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753 (holding that Miranda serves to guard
against use of unreliable statements at trial). Stone, therefore, may rest more on
hostility to the exclusionary rule than to habeas corpus as such. See also Stone, 428
U.S. at 481 (purporting to rest the Court's holding on "the nature and purpose of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule"). Yet insofar as the former's unpopularity
stems from its suppression of typically reliable, often indispensable, evidence of guilt,
see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984); Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-
90, it furnished a logical jumping-off point for an innocence-centered writ. Cf Berger,
supra note 179, at 99 (stating that the Court has linked a "disfavored
right"--effective assistance of defense counsel-with the "unloved remedy" of habeas
corpus, "and not enhanced the status of either").
198. See supra text accompanying note 188.
199. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
200. Teague has spawned a mini-library of critical work within the overall habeas
literature. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Ret-
roactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991); Steven M.
Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced Federal Habeas
Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1990-1991); Liebman, "Slightly Retro," supra note 175.
201. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313; see Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416
(1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990). The Court made plain its expecta-
tion that few 'such components of basic due process have yet to emerge." Teague,
489 U.S. at 313. It gave as examples chestnuts like the right not to be tried in an
atmosphere dominated by mob violence, the right not to have perjured testimony
knowingly introduced by the State, and the right to exclude one's brutally coerced
confession from trial. Id. at 314. Notably, in none of the half-dozen cases in which
the Justices could have applied the exemption in question did they do so. See, e.g.,
Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2119 (1993); Butler, 494 U.S. at 416; Parks, 494
U.S. at 495. Another, even narrower proviso permitted retroactive application of a
new rule that "places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to
proscribe." Parks, 494 U.S. at 494; see Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989), in which a majority endorsed the plurality's position in Teague
in a capital case (which Teague was not), held that this exemption included prohi-
bitions on " 'a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of
their status or offense.' " See Parks, 494 U.S. at 494-95 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at
329-30).
202. See generally Bilionis, supra note 37, at 1652 (stating that Teague's "capacity
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retically looked to preserve and, conceivably, even enhance the
protection of innocence,"' regarded by the current Court as the
bedrock value of habeas.
Two other lines of precedent, however (merged now, in rele-
vant respects"4), offered a still more promising prospect. These
involved the treatment of state procedural defaults and of repeti-
tive requests for the writ, based on either contentions previously
heard and .rejected or on contentions not raised before.0 5 In
each of these areas, the Court has been fashioning an obstacle
course for habeas applicants, replacing the generous law of the
1960's with draconian door-closing doctrines. The Court has
ended in each, however, by making the possible factual inno-
cence of the defendant an "open sesame," thereby adopting the
second (noncategorical) approach outlined above.0 6
Briefly stated, in the 1970's the generous reign of Fay v.
Noia, pursuant to which a forfeiture of state court remedies
did not forestall federal relief unless a petitioner "deliberately
bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts,"2 °8 yielded
to the strict regime of Wainwright v. Sykes. °9 Under Sykes,
for drastically reducing the role of the federal courts in death cases needs no elabo-
ration"); Patchel, supra note 175, at 982 ("The retroactivity doctrine limits both the
practical efficacy of rights and the avenues available for their vindication . . ").
203. Incredibly, in the actual case, the State urged that Herrera's proposed new
rule would not fall under the accuracy exception. See Brief for Respondent at 42-44,
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (No. 91-7328). Because "[rletroactivity is
properly treated as a threshold question," Teague, 489 U.S. at 300, the Courtfs fail-
ure to mention the argument in the opinion on the merits intimates a rejection of
it. Cf Evans v. Muncy, 916 F.2d 163, 165-66 (4th Cir.) (calling the petitioner's claim
that "the Constitution requires a state to reestablish the validity of an error-free
sentence because a prisoner desires to present character evidence based on his post-
sentencing conduct" a new rule having "nothing to do with the accuracy of his con-
viction"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 927 (1990).
204. See infra text accompanying note 225.
205. The petition before the Court in Herrera belonged in the latter category. See
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 189-90.
207. 372 U.S. 291 (1963).
208. Id. at 438. Even then, the district judge had discretion to overlook the bypass.
See id.
209. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). For a description of the intirvening decisions, see Jack A.
Guttenberg, Federal Habeas Corpus, Constitutional Rights, and Procedural Forfei-
tures: The Delicate Balance, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 617, 623-45 (1984); Ralph S.
Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L.
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authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, a defaulting defendant
could obtain a hearing only if he was able to demonstrate
"'cause' " and" 'prejudice,'" a standard the Court did not define,
other than to suggest its narrowness.' Although Sykes and its
early progeny insisted that victims of a fundamental miscarriage
of justice would meet this test,211 in 1986 in Murray v. Carri-
er,2 ' the Court acknowledged the need for a slender escape
hatch in an "extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation
has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent" yet cannot demonstrate cause. 1 '
REV. 473, 500-09 (1978). Like the rule of Teague, see supra text accompanying notes
198-202, the modern law of procedural default has produced a voluminous critical
literature. The works upon which I have relied in the following discussion include:
Berger, supra note 5, at 1691-92 & n.169 (citing sources); Berger, supra note 179, at
18-25; Patchel, supra note 175, at 965-77; Ruthann Robson & Michael Mello,
Ariadne's Provisions: A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of Procedural Default, Ade-
quate and Independent State Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty, 76 CAL. L. REV.
87 (1988); and Yale L. Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: Procedural Defaults by
Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1978).
210. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 (referring to the "rule of [Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536 (1976)], barring federal habeas review absent a showing of 'cause' and
'prejudice' "). "Prejudice" remained a vague concept. See United States v. Frady, 456
U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (errors must work to defendant's "actual and substantial disad-
vantage"). It probably refers to the effect on the outcome of the trial, similar to
harmless error analysis with a reversed burden of proof. See Berger, supra note 179,
at 21-22; Bruce S. Ledewitz, Procedural Default in Death Penalty Cases: Fundamen-
tal Miscarriage of Justice and Actual Innocence, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 379, 389 (1988).
"Cause" came to imply " 'some objective factor external to the defense [which] im-
peded counsel's efforts' to raise the claim in state court." See McCleskey v. Zant, 111
S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). Such
factors included interference by officials, unavailability of the claim's factual or legal
basis, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
211. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91.
212. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
213. See id. at 496. This formulation embodies the "blended" approach to innocence,
focusing "on both the claims that can be raised and the persons who can raise
them." 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 2.2, at 20 n.83 (1988); see also supra text
accompanying note 190. In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), handed down to-
gether with Carrier and Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), the Court began
to develop a notion of "innocence of death," conceding, however, that " 'actual,' as
distinct from 'legal,' innocence," see supra note 179, 'does not translate easily into
the context of an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital of-
fense." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 537. Ultimately, Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514
(1992), held: "Sensible meaning is given to the term 'innocent of the death penalty'
by allowing a showing in addition to innocence of the capital crime itself. . . that
there was no aggravating circumstance or that some other condition of eligibility had
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That same day, the Court decided Kuhlmann v. Wilson.1 4
Kuhlmann involved not a defaulted but rather a repetitive
claim-one that had been resolved before by the federal
courts.215 Invoking Judge Friendly and referring, as usual, to
the high costs of collateral review,216 Justice Powell, writing for
a plurality of four, concluded that the " 'ends of justice' 1,217 re-
quire consideration of such applications "only where the prisoner
supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of
factual innocence."21 Stressing the factual, not legal, focus of
that standard,21 the plurality significantly implied that he
could produce new evidence to show his innocence.22 °
not been met." Id. at 2522 (footnote omitted). That showing, notably, had to be
made by "clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 2517. In so holding, the Justices re-
jected both the Solicitor General's submission-limiting the concept solely to inno-
cence of the crime-and Sawyer's own, which would have expanded upon the Court's
definition to include situations where erroneous exclusion of mitigating evidence led
to the sentencer's being "presented with ' "a factually inaccurate sentencing profile"
of the petitioner." Id. at 2521 (citations omitted).
214. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
215. As is often true, the defendant pressed for a second hearing because of an
intervening decision in his favor. See id. at 442. The petitioner sought to rely on
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), in support of his allegation of an in-
terrogation violative of the Sixth Amendment. Id.; see also LIEBMAN, supra note 126,.
§ 26.4, at 390 n.57 (Supp. 1992) (citing numerous cases). For a general discussion of
successive petitions, see id. § 26.3 (new-claim successive petitions) and id. § 26.4
(same-claim successive petitions); LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§
150-56 (1981 & Supp. 1993). For a brief summary of governing doctrine prior to the
changes effected by McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), and Sawyer, see
infra note 217 and accompanying text and note 220; Berger, supra note 5, at 1682-
83. For competing versions of the relevant history-in particular, the interplay be-
tween Congress and the Court-compare McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1454-68 with id.
at 1477-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
216. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452-54 (plurality opinion); see supra text accompanying
note 185.
217. This vague (but clearly more generous) test, drawn from Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), then controlled when habeas courts should hear same-
claim successive petitions. See Berger, supra note 5, at 1682.
218. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454. This formulation, on its face, embodies the pure
"status" approach to innocence: targeting the claimant's standing as an innocent or
guilty person rather than the nature of his claim. See supra text accompanying note
189.
219. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 454 ("The prisoner must make his evidentiary
showing even though . . . the evidence of guilt may have been unlawfully admit-
ted .... ").
220. In that regard, the plurality relied directly on Judge Friendly's views,
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Justice Powell never garnered a fifth vote for the position he
urged in Kuhlmann. But in 1991, a few years after he left the
bench, a majority of the Court adopted the essence of his pro-
posed approach. McCleskey v. Zant,22' which (unlike
Kuhlmann) dealt with a new-claim successive petition chal-
lenged as an abuse of the writ, altered the rules for entertaining
such applications by substituting the cause-and-prejudice or
innocence test drawn from the area of procedural default 22 for
the generally more forgiving criteria used earlier in this set-
ting."2 Without discussion, the Court rapidly extended its
sway to same-claim successors in Sawyer v. Whitley.224 As of
[T]he prisoner must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the evi-
dence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with
due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to
have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the
trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of
his guilt."
Id. at 455 n.17 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Friendly, supra note
175, at 160). Under prevailing same-claim successor law, petitioners were given a
second shot when "[niewly discovered evidence render[ed] meritorious a claim reject-
ed for lack of proof in the prior proceeding, particularly if the state impeded the
discovery of the evidence." See LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 26.4, at 391 (Supp. 1992)
(footnote omitted).
221. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
222. Id. at 1470; supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
223. See LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 26.2, at 361-62 n.38 (Supp. 1992). The
Kuhlmann plurality described these criteria as follows: "[Wihere a prisoner files a
petition raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition,
or engages in other conduct that 'disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks,' the federal
court may dismiss the subsequent petition on the ground that the prisoner has
abused the writ." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 444 n.6 (quoting Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. at 1, 17-19 (1963)). More specifically, the inquiry was "whether the peti-
tioner 'deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the writ'
because [her] 'only purpose [was] to vex, harass, or delay.' " Berger, supra note 5, at
1682 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1988) and Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18). See generally
LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 26.3c (Supp. 1992) (listing a number of situations in
which claimants would likely satisfy both McCleskey and previous law). Among other
things, adjudication of new claims was allowed if "[nleither the petitioner nor coun-
sel was, or with reasonable diligence could have become, aware of the facts giving
rise to the new claim." Id. § 26.3, at 378 (footnote omitted).
224. 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992). Sawyer's second habeas petition contained both
successive and abusive claims. Id. at 2517. Justice Kennedy, the author of Sawyer
and McCleskey, wrote as though the "doctrinal advance" had already oc-
curred-describing the Kuhlmann plurality opinion as the holding of the Court. See
id. at 2518-19; McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1471; LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 26.4, at
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the present time, therefore, a unified field theory of forfeiture
governs in habeas corpus proceedings." 5
Ironically, the cloud banks massing over state defendants who
wished to obtain federal review appeared to hold a silver lining
for Herrera. Contraction of the writ's perimeter toward a central
core of innocence amounted to expansion of the nucleus-at
least, in terms of relative significance. Herrera, moreover, rep-
resented the pith of the core. As a defendant sentenced to death
for a crime he declared he had nothing to do with, he seemed
just the kind of person targeted for the miscarriage of justice
"detour around the successive petition, abuse of the writ, and
procedural default roadblocks."228
Yet even a stubborn optimist would have paused before pre-
dicting that the Court would fully embrace the logic of its " 'exal-
tation of accuracy.' ,27 Rhetoric extolling the role of habeas as
392 (Supp. 1992). See generally id. § 26.4, at 393 n.68 (noting that "considerable
overlap" exists between new and traditional tests). A month before Sawyer, the hege-
mony of the cause-and-prejudice or innocence standard had already broadened to
include the case of failure to develop a material fact in state court proceedings, a
distinct type of procedural default previously controlled by a lenient deliberate by-
pass test. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992) (holding that a judge
may deny a federal hearing in such a case), overruling Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963).
225. The recent opinions tend to quote in the same breath the relevant language
from Carrier and Kuhlmann. See supra notes 212-18 and accompanying text; see,
e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 882 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Saw-
yer, 112 S. Ct. at 2519 & nn.5-6; McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470-71. I suspect,
though, that the Court, if faced squarely with the issue, would require the nexus be-
tween the claim and the claimant implied by the word "resulted" in Carrier, which
does not appear in Kuhlmann. Compare supra text accompanying notes 212-13 with
supra text accompanying notes 217-18. Generally, however, there seems to be no
difference between the two tests regarding the burden or standard of proof or the
connotations of "actual" and "factual," used interchangeably to modify either "inno-
cent" or "innocence." See, e.g., Harris' v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 271 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (citing Carrier, 489 U.S. at 495-96, where the Court used the phrase
"actually innocent," while the Justice herself employed the term "factually innocent").
They both reflect the predominant current emphasis on an individualized rather
than a categorical approach to the notion of innocence. See generally Dugger v. Ad-
ams, 489 TJ.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989) (asserting that, in the context of challenge to
capital sentence, a categorical approach to miscarriage of justice would convert an
" 'extraordinary case' " "into an all too ordinary one") (citation omitted).
226. Dubber, supra note 148, at 103 n.81.
227. See Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2527 (Blackmun J., concurring in judgment) (quoting
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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a "safety valve" for innocence..8 and similar verbiage had been
employed mainly to reach the result of finality."9 The Justices
themselves have never found a petitioner innocent of either his
crime 1 0 or his sentence, 31 so as to excuse a forfeiture. Fur-
ther, perusal of lower court cases over a period of several years
reveals only a handful of instances in which the defendant pre-
vailed in an effort to surmount threshold barriers to review
through a show of probable innocence. 2  One might account
228. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 271 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229. See Patchel, supra note 175, at 958-59.
230. See McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1474-75 (1991) (agreeing with the
district court's conclusion that there was "absolutely no doubt' about guilt of defen-
dant); cf Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2568 (1991) (noting that the defen-
dant did not urge in the Court that habeas review was needed to prevent a miscar-
riage of justice); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (remanding for a deter-
mination whether the defendant, in fact, suffered a miscarriage of justice).
231. See Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2523-25 (finding that the defendant failed to show
that, absent the alleged error, no reasonable juror could have found him eligible for
the death penalty); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989) (holding that fact
that trial judge "found an equal number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
is not sufficient to show that an alleged error in instructing the jury on sentencing
resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice"); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 427,
537-39 (1986) (rejecting a suggestion of fundamental unfairness where there was no
substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the sentencing determination).
232. See, e.g., Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
defendant was actually innocent of life sentence not authorized by statute); Hamilton
v. Jones, 789 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (holding that probability of factual in-
nocence existed, where prosecutor discriminated in the exercise of peremptory
strikes, thereby casting the fairness of the proceeding in doubt); United States v.
Varley, No. 91 CR 467, 1992 WL 159389 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 1992) (holding defendant
entitled to a hearing on a claim under Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535
(1992), because entrapment, if it occurred, would amount to a coinplete miscarriage
of justice); Harris v. United States, 793 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (holding
defendant not guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm because his right to
bear arms had been restored); Simpson v. Camper, 743 F. Supp. 1342 (W.D. Mo.
1990) (nullifying an Alford plea to manslaughter by a 14-year-old, where she denied
she had killed her mother, and her father was the likely culprit), vacated as moot,
974 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1992); Reid v. Warden, 708 F. Supp. 730 (W.D.N.C. 1989)
(holding that use of an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption probably led to
conviction of an innocent, where evidence was purely circumstantial); cf Rode v.
Lockhart, 675 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (holding, in a confused opinion,
that counsel's inadequate assistance probably caused the conviction of a defendant
"actually innocent" of first-degree murder, as opposed to a lesser charge).
My informal survey covered 1987 through the first nine months of 1992. Al-
though I kept no exact tally, failures of claims of likely innocence clearly outnum-
bered successes by a large multiple. See Pruett v. Thompson, 771 F. Supp. 1428,
986
19941 GATEWAY OF INNOCENCE 987
for these statistics by speculating that almost none of the appli-
cants was, in fact, guiltlessY But equally likely, those courts
well understood the majority Justices' plain intent to impose an
extremely strong presumption against petitioners in this
situation 4
Worse, however, for the petitioner than the stinginess of the
Carrier-Kuhlmann doctrine, in both theory and application, the
Court had issued explicit (if fairly elderly) dicta rejecting the
availability of habeas for "freestanding claims of actual inno-
cence" 5 not linked to a separate constitutional infringement
such as, for example, the prosecution's knowing use of perjured
testimony3 6  or suppression of exculpatory evidence. 7  In
1963, in Townsend v. Sain,2 which listed various circum-
stances mandating federal evidentiary hearings on petitioners'
allegations, the Court included instances of newly discovered
evidence "which could not reasonably have been presented to the
state trier of facts."23 9 In the same breath, then Chief Justice
Warren opined: "Of course, such evidence must bear upon the
constitutionality of the applicant's detention; the existence merely
1443 (E.D. Va. 1991) ("The actual innocence exception is at this point only theoreti-
cal."), affd, 996 F.2d 1560 (4th Cir. 1993). Notably, several of the victories involved
legal as much as factual innocence-differing therein from Herrera's contention. See,
e.g., Jones, 929 F.2d at 375 (finding that the defendant was sentenced under a stat-
ute not in force when the crime was committed). Not unrelatedly, virtually all were
decided on the original record. But see Simpson, 743 F. Supp. at 1343 (district court
conducted an evidentiary hearing). And a few plainly stretched the idea of miscar-
riage of justice beyond what the Court had intended. See, e.g., Hamilton, 789 F.
Supp. at 301 (finding probability of actual innocence because racial discrimination in
selection of jurors casts doubt upon the integrity of the judicial process). Someone in
the petitioner's shoes, therefore, should have drawn small comfort from these results.
233. But cf infra notes 365-69 and accompanying text (noting that innocent defen-
dants have been sentenced to death).
234. That intent inheres in the use of the word "extraordinary." See Harris v.
Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); supra note 213 and ac-
companying text.
235. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 863 (1993).
236. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
237. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Applicants who assert their
innocence on the basis of new evidence are likely to raise related arguments under
Brady, as did Herrera. See supra note 64.
238. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
239. Id. at 317.
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of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state pris-
oner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.""°
Members of the Court (for the most part, predictable liberals)
occasionally voiced a dissenting view,"' as did academics. 2
240. Id. (emphasis added). Indirectly, the Court was saying that such a contention
would not amount to a claim of "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ...
of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988); compare Hysler v. Florida, 315
U.S. 411, 413 (1942) (mere recantation of testimony does not invoke due process
clause).
241. See Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1234-35, 1238 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of stay and certiorari) (in the face of
sworn recantation by sole witness, dissenting Justices would grant stay of execution
pending determination of claim that rules barring post-trial reconsideration of guilt
should be subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny); see also Evans v. Muncy, 498 U.S.
927, 931 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of stay) (dissenting Justice
would grant stay of execution to "accommodate post-sentencing evidence casting
doubt on a jury's finding of future dangerousness"). In Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277
(1956), a pre-Townsend procedural dismissal in a case where the State had denied a
post-conviction challenge, the four dissenting Justices wrote:
It is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the use of testimony
known by the prosecution to be perjured offends due process .... While
the petition did not allege that the prosecution knew that petitioner's
codefendants were lying when they implicated petitioner, the State now
knows that the testimony of the only witnegses against petitioner was
false. No competent evidence remains to support the conviction. Depriva-
tion of a hearing under these circumstances amounts in my opinion to a
denial of due process of law.
Id. at 290-91 (Douglas, J., joined by Warren, Black and Clark, JJ., dissenting) (ci-
tations omitted).
242. For an early expression of this sort, see Carlson, supra note 98, and (oddly)
Professor Bator, supra note 153, at 509. Another 1960's-era commentator
overconfidently predicted that the Court would have little trouble in "declar[ing] that
any conviction obtained as a result of perjured testimony unknowingly utilized by
the prosecution in a state or federal trial does violence to the right of due process."
Daniel E. Murray, Convictions Obtained by Perjured Testimony: A Comparative View,
27 OHIO ST. L.J. 102, 107 (1966). Offering a more cautious assessment, Judge
Wright (then on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) and
Abraham D. Sofaer noted: "It is arguably a violation of due process if the state
refuses to vacate a conviction entirely based upon evidence later shown to be untrue,
though not necessarily suppressed or withheld. In effect, there is no probative evi-
dence left supporting such convictions." J. Skelly Wright & Abraham D. Sofaer, Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility,
75 YALE L.J. 895, 958 n.223 (1966). At the time these authors wrote, the "no evi-
dence" test prevailed. See supra note 79. Following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979), they might have expanded their formulation to take account of cases where
later events revealed a lack of sufficient true evidence to meet the reasonable doubt
standard. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78. Finally, for more recent scholar-
ship taking an approach different from Townsend, see Barry Friedman, A Tale of
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Indeed, Judge Friendly himself recommended opening post-con-
viction forums, state and federal, to colorable claims of factual
innocence."43 Additionally, a few courts of appeals had held
that, under certain conditions,' allegations of new, favorable
evidence stated a basis for collateral attack. 5 Generally,
though, the circuits have followed the above-quoted passage, 6
Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 322-24 (1988), and, with respect to death-sen-
tenced prisoners, see Ledewitz, supra note 175, at 444-49, and Freedman, supra note
128, at 315, 319 n.22.
243. See Friendly, supra note 175, at 159 & n.87, 160, 167. He appeared, however,
to be recommending legislative change, not reinterpretation of the Constitution, to
cover claims such as Herrera's. See id. at 160; see generally Freedman, supra note
128 (proposing two different statutes); Ledewitz, supra note 175, at 448-49
(supporting extension of the habeas statute to such claims).
244. See Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938) (holding that the State
must afford corrective process to a death-sentenced prisoner, where the attorney
general believes the defendant was convicted on peijured testimony and the Gover-
nor conceives himself bound by a pledge to deny clemency); cf. Grace v. Butterworth,
586 F.2d 878, 880 (1st Cir. 1978) (assuming arguendo that "compelling claim for
relief might be presented when newly available evidence conclusively shows that a
vital mistake had been made"). Jones was later confined to its facts in Burks v.
Egeler, 512 F.2d 221, 227-29 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); see Sand-
ers v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting the criticism of Jones by
Burks).
245. See, e.g., Lewis v. Erickson, 946 F.2d 1361, 1362 (8th Cir. 1991) ("We grant
habeas relief based on newly discovered evidence if the evidence ' "would probably
produce an acquittal on retrial." ' ") (citations omitted); Sanders, 863 F.2d at 222,
225-26 (holding that the State's failure to vacate conviction after credible recantation
denies due process if, "but for the peijured testimony, the defendant would most
likely not have been convicted"). Sanders contains a thoughtful discussion of the
court's reasons for departing from the Townsend dicta. Among other things, the opin-
ion made clear that "a state's failure to act to cure a conviction" can amount to
"sufficient state action" to call into play due process protections. Id. at 224. But it
also stressed "that the perjured testimony which will trigger a due process violation
must be of an extraordinary nature." Id. at 226 (emphasis added); cf infra text
accompanying note 317 (discussing the Court's similar attitude toward cases of pur-
ported innocence).
246. See supra text accompanying note 240; see, e.g., Boyd v. Puckett, 905 F.2d
895, 896-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 988 (1990); Smith v. Wainwright, 741
F.2d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985); United States
ex rel. Burnett v. Illinois, 619 F.2d 668, 674 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880
(1980); Burks v. Egeler, 512 F.2d at 227-30; Marcella v. United States, 344 F.2d
876, 880 (9th Cir. 1965); see also Evans v. Muncy, 916 F.2d 163, 165-66 (4th Cir.)
(holding that newly discovered evidence that a death-sentenced defendant may have
been innocent of single established aggravating factor provides no basis for habeas
relief), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 927 (1990); cf. Ex parte Binder, 660 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (adhering to the Townsend approach).
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which the Justices never retracted. Although one could in some
respects distinguish Herrera's case from Townsend's, as his
counsel attempted to do, 7 the defense team plainly would con-
front an uphill course in their effort to establish that "[a] death
sentence that is dead wrong is no less so simply because its defi-
ciency is not uncovered until the eleventh hour." 8
D. Federal and State Law Blended: The Constitution and State
Post-Conviction Remedies 9
It seemed, thus, that putative innocence might furnish a key
to the federal courthouse under the Carrier-Kuhlmann doc-
trine."' But entry would not avail Herrera if Townsend im-
mediately slammed the door shut in his face. That problem leads
to the inquiry whether the gateway of habeas corpus could lead
elsewhere-in particular, back to the state courts-to the benefit
of a petitioner such as Herrera. I explore the topic in greater de-
tail in Part V of this Article.251 For now, I give the relevant
background.
In the mid-1960's, in Case v. Nebraska, the Court granted
certiorari 2 to decide if "the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the States afford state prisoners some adequate corrective
process for the hearing and determination of claims of violation
247. For example, while Townsend was also a capital proceeding, the defendant
there challenged his conviction-not his "unjust execution." Townsend's state, Illinois,
also provided an opportunity for him to assert innocence after judgment, which the
defendant did not do. Townsend's case, moreover, preceded the many modem deci-
sions affording heightened scrutiny to the death-determining process. See Brief for
Petitioner at 39-40 n.52, Herrera (No. 91-7328).
248. Evans v. Muncy, 498 U.S. 927, 931 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of stay).
249. Useful readings on this topic include: PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 589-90, 1559-60 (3d ed.
1988 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126,
§ 7.1b (1988 & Supp. 1992); Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Ade-
quate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 187;
Wright & Sofaer, supra note 242; Note, Effect of the Federal Constitution in Requir-
ing State Post-Conviction Remedies, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (1953); and Comment,
State Court Withdrawal from Habeas Corpus, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1081 (1966).
250. The petitioner needed such a key since he had filed a second application for
habeas corpus. See supra text accompanying notes 56, 221-23.
251. See infra part V.
252. Case v. Nebraska, 379 U.S. 958 (1965).
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of federal constitutional guarantees.""5 The issue arose in the
context of a guilty plea to a burglary charge. The defendant
sought to challenge the judgment, alleging denial of assistance
of counsel, by initiating a habeas proceeding in a local court.
While recognizing the plea's infirmity, if the allegation was true,
the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismiss-
al of the action on the basis that the remedy did not lie where
the trial court had jurisdiction and imposed a sentence within
its power.2" Nor, apparently, did he have any other collateral
route to pursue to obtain redress." Thus, he was presenting
the question whether the Constitution confers a right to post-
conviction review.
The Justices left this significant issue unresolved, remanding
the case for reconsideration in light of a supervening statute
that, on its face, provided a hearing for Case's complaint.25 A
decade later, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote in a plurality opinion
in United States v. MacCollom2. 7 that due process "does not
establish any right.., to collaterally attack a final judgment of
conviction."258 As Chief Justice, he repeated this dictum twice
in the 1980's: once, in Pennsylvania v. Finley.9 (a non-capital
prosecution) for a majority of the Court, and again in Murray v.
Giarratano260 (a civil rights action brought by death-sentenced
prisoners) for himself and Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia.
In Giarratano, -these four also opined that the Eighth Amend-
ment did not compel a different result.26'
253. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965).
254. Id. at 336-37.
255. Id. at 341 & n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
256. Id. at 337. Without expressing a view on the merits of the claim, both Jus-
tices Clark and Brennan, in separate concurrences, applauded the law's enactment.
Id. at 339-40 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 345-47 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also
Maurice Kelman, Federal Habeas Corpus as a Source of New Constitutional Require-
ments for State Criminal Procedure, 28 Omo ST. L.J. 46, 63 (1967) (noting that the
two Justices praised the Nebraska statute).
257. 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
258. Id. at 323 (plurality opinion) (citation and footnote omitted).
259. 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) "States have no obligation to provide this avenue
of relief." Id. at 556 (citing MacCollom).
260. 492 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Finley).
261. Id. The Suspension Clause of the Constitution mandates that "[t]he Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Re-
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Yet the above-mentioned decisions had little to do with
Herrera's predicament. MacCollom rejected a federal defendant's
challenge, on equal protection grounds, to the failure to furnish
him a free trial transcript for use in connection with a planned
motion to vacate his sentence.2  Notably, the prisoner could
have gotten what he desired had he appealed from his conviction
two years earlier or had he later met the conditions of a not
unreasonable statute .2 " Finley involved a comprehensive state
post-conviction scheme that even assigned counsel for
indigents.2  In this setting, the Justices held that Pennsylva-
nia could permit such counsel to withdraw from a matter he and
the trial court deemed frivolous without following the constitu-
tionally mandated process for withdrawal on direct appeal as of
right.265 Giarratano, finally, held only that neither due process
nor the Eighth Amendment required Virginia to appoint lawyers
for death row inmates seeking state collateral relief.266
In MacCollom, Finley, and Giarratano, the applicant, thus,
had a forum in which to mount his attack; it simply lacked some
perquisite that would have helped him in the proceeding. But
Case, as we have seen, had none-at least at the point he raised
the challenge.267 Herrera, too, had no place to go at a relevant
bellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Although the language might be read to afford a post-conviction remedy for state
prisoners, see Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1509
& n.329 (1987), the clause is more plausibly understood as constraining only the fed-
eral government. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 200, at 1779 n.244; Friendly,
supra note 175, at 172; Comment, supra note 249, at 1087-88 (citing cases).
262. MacCollom, 426 U.S. at 324-25.
263. He had to persuade the trial judge to certify that his application was " 'not
frivolous' " and that the transcript was " 'needed to decide the issue presented.' " Id.
at 325 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 753(f)).
264. Finley, 481 U.S. at 553-54.
265. Id. at 554-59. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), laid down a compli-
cated set of rules controlling the latter situation. The Giarratano plurality later
described Finley as resting on readings of both the Due Process Clause and "the
equal protection guarantee of 'meaningful access.' " Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 7.
266. See generally Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 10-11. Justice Kennedy, who provided
the fifth vote for the majority, narrowly concurred "[oin the facts and the record of
this case," stating that no inmate "has been unable to obtain counsel to represent
him in postconviction proceedings, and Virginia's prison system is staffed with insti-
tutional lawyers to assist in preparing petitions for postconviction relief." Id. at 14-
15. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
267. It is unclear why he did not appeal his conviction. Nebraska's response to the
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time. Like Nebraska, Texas did not extend state habeas to the
kind of claim in question.268 Although Texas, unlike Nebraska,
provided some post-conviction court with competence over
Herrera's complaint,269 his new evidence did not surface during
the unrealistically brief thirty-day limitations period; hence, in
fact, he had no recourse.'
Further, with current and foreseeable changes in the Court's
personnel,2"' one should pause before elevating recent dictum
to the status of definitive holding. That is particularly true
when, in the most pertinent context (for present purposes) in
which it appears, the capital case of Giarratano, only a plurality
signed the opinion. In addition, in positing that the Constitution
accords no right to collateral review--even for defendants sen-
tenced to death-the Chief Justice did little but parrot the oper-
ative words of MacCollom and Finley and, citing a number of
decisions from the 1980's, propound the view that "death's differ-
ence" applies solely at the trial level.272
petition conceded that the state courts had never passed upon his claim. Case v.
Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 341 n.3 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). Theoretically, he
could have done so-he pled guilty a month after Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), guaranteed appointed counsel to indigent state felony defendants. Case,
381 U.S. at 340. Practically speaking, one may surmise that he failed to appeal just
because he lacked the assistance of an attorney. He alleged that he " 'was "fast
talked" and forcibly coerced into waiving his rights to have advice and counsel . . .
and to plead not-guilty.' " Id. at 340 n.1 (quoting petition for habeas corpus). See
generally Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees assigned counsel to indigent defendants on first appeal as of
right).
268. See supra note 21.
269. Unlike Case, see supra note 267, Herrera could not, even theoretically, have
raised his claim on direct appeal since appellate courts are bound by the record.
270. Most petitioners, especially those under sentence of death, will be unable to
uncover such evidence within a month. See supra text accompanying note 128.
271. As I write, Justice Ginsburg has taken the oath of office to replace retiring
Justice White. See Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg Sworn in as 107th Justice and 2nd
Woman on Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1993, at A6.
272. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1989) (plurality opinion). But cf supra
text accompanying note 163 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment guarantees "mean-
ingful appellate review" in capital cases); Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 23-24 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that there is significant evidence that direct review in capital
cases 'does not sufficiently protect against miscarriages of justice to warrant a pre-
sumption of finality).
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Indeed, the grant of certiorari in Case itself indicates the
substantiality of the question whether the states must furnish "a
postconviction remedy that offers an 'adequate corrective process
for the hearing ... of [claims of violation of] federal constitution-
al guarantees' "'73 and, if so, just what amounts to "an
'adequate' process" in this setting.14 It is clear, moreover, that
273. 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 7.1b, at 70-71 & n.48 (1988) (footnote omitted);
see generally Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[Tihe scope of the State's obligation to provide collateral review is shrouded in ...
much uncertainty ... .") (citing Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965)); cf. Bator,
supra note 153, at 489-93 (noting that some early cases like Mooney v. Holahan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935), intimated that the State may be obliged to afford such correc-
tive process); Friendly, supra note 175, at 172 (positing that "in some cases," a
state's "complete denial of post-conviction remedies . . .would violate the due pro-
cess clause"). Because the states have greatly enhanced their post-conviction remedial
schemes since the 1960's, the Court has had little opportunity to face anew the type
of question presented in Case. See Kenneth J. Hodson et al., Postconviction Reme-
dies, in 4 AMERICAN BAR ASSN STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 22-1.1, at 22-8
(2d ed. 1978) (noting that a great majority of states have adopted modem post-con-
viction procedures). To my knowledge, Arkansas is the only state to abolish a provi-
sion establishing broad-based grounds for relief on collateral attack, thereby remit-
ting would-be petitioners to state habeas, a "remedy" as limited as that in Case. See
Whitmore v. State, 771 S.W.2d 266, 267 & n.1 (Ark. 1989) (abolishing ARK. R. CRIM.
P. 37, with the intent of narrowing post-conviction relief). But the Arkansas Su-
preme Court, which had taken this drastic action out of pique at supposed abuses
and delays, id. at 267-69, reversed its course the following year. It reinstated the
rule in question, with modifications (modeled on recent ones in Missouri) designed
chiefly to shorten the post-conviction process. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1 publisher's
notes (Michie 1993). See generally John M. Morris, Post-Conviction Practice Under
the "New 27.26," 43 Mo. B.J. 435 (1987) (discussing Missouri's remedial cutbacks).
274. 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 7.1b, at 71 (1988). With respect to the duty, not
of state but of federal courts, even the narrowest historical and normative vision of
habeas views it as an appropriate remedy for failures of process in state court pro-
ceedings. See supra note 186 (treating Professor Bator's thesis); see also Wright v.
West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2486-87 (1992) (plurality opinion) (relying on the Bator ap-
proach); Friendly, supra note 175 (incorporating part of the "process" theory into his
approach). Nowadays, the absence or ineffectiveness of state collateral review proce-
dures constitutes a "recognized exception" to various rules burdening federal habeas
petitioners: the requirement of exhaustion of state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) &
(d) (1988); the barrier of state procedural default, see supra text accompanying notes
209-13; the door-closing doctrine of Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), see supra
text accompanying note 191 and note 192 and accompanying text; and the presump-
tion of correctness of state court factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988);
infra note 353 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 437-38. See gen-
erally 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 7.1b, at 68-69 (1988). Discussion of these com-
plex and multifaceted subjects falls beyond the scope of this piece. But it is worth
noting, finally, that irrespective of the State's duty, if any, to furnish a post-convic-
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a Herrera-type complaint-which, by its nature, does not arise
until after trial and cannot be heard on direct appeal-poses the
most compelling argument for such a duty. 5 In 1986, a divid-
ed Court, ruling in favor of a capital defendant in Ford v. Wain-
wright,76 gave some credence to this approach. A majority
agreed that the prisoner had a substantive Eighth Amendment
right to avoid execution if he was insane and that Florida,
whose own laws also accorded this right, 77 had instituted defi-
cient means for its protection.7 They disagreed about what, as
a minimum, the Constitution required by way of procedural
safeguards. 9 Suggestively, Justice Marshall wrote for himself
and three other members of the Court: "[i]f the Constitution ren-
ders the fact or timing of [the inmate's] execution contingent
upon establishment of a further fact"-here, present sani-
ty--"then that fact must be determined with the high regard for
truth that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human
being."2"' He excoriated, above all, the State's placement of the
decision wholly in the executive branch: "The. commander of the
State's corps of prosecutors cannot be said to have the neutrality
that is necessary for reliability in the factfinding proceed-
tion forum for attacks on the constitutionality of a judgment, "once [a state] chooses
to do so, the due process clause ... may require that the means it provides be full
and fair." Id. § 7.1b, at 71-72 (footnote omitted) (citing cases).
275. See 1 LEEMAN, supra note 126, § 7.1b, at 72-73 (1988); Sandalow, supra note
249, at 211.
276. 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (plurality opinion).
277. Id. at 403; see infra note 278.
278. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 411-16 (plurality opinion); id. at 423-25 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor concurred
solely on the ground that the State had "created a protected liberty interest in
avoiding execution while incompetent" and then failed to provide the minimal pro-
cedural safeguards mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 427 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
279. Compare id. at 411-18 (Marshall, J.) (plurality opinion) with id. at 424-27
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) and id. at 429-30
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the result in part and concurring in the judgment).
280. Id. at 411. But as the Chief Justice later noted, five Justices rejected the view
(expressed in the plurality's next sentence) that determining "a prisoner's sanity as a
predicate to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those de-
manded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding." Id. at 411-12; see Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at
411-12).
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ing."25' Similarly, Herrera could urge, as he ultimately did, 2
that if an execution's validity depends on the prisoner's actual
guilt, the State must furnish a mode of ascertaining that fact (or
reascertaining it,288 on a suitably serious challenge subsequent
to its proof at trial) consistent with the need for trustworthiness
in a life-or-death determination.2"
Yet, to be sure, Florida afforded some process 285-although
one suspiciously resembling a clemency procedure," 6 which
Herrera naturally rejected as inadequate.287 Ford, therefore,
was not asking the Court to open a forum the State had shut
entirely."' And, whereas Ford merely impugned his present
281. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416; cf. id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (believing that the State should provide, at least, an "im-
partial officer or board").
282. See Brief for Petitioner at 41, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (No.
91-7328).
283. Ford proceedings may also involve revisiting facts that have been deter-
mined-in whole or in part-prior to or at the trial, in determining fitness to pro-
ceed or lack of criminal responsibility based on mental disease or defect. For typical
standards governing those respective inquiries (albeit in a non-death penalty state),
see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW art. 730 (Consol. 1986) and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15
(Consol. 1984). See generally Ford, 477 U.S. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (remarking that no state requires less than "that
those who are executed know the fact of their impending execution and the reason
for it").
284. See supra text accompanying notes 155, 280.
285. See generally Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (holding that Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court erred in affirming a death sentence based in part on since-
vacated felony conviction in New York, and that failure to raise this claim on direct
appeal did not amount to procedural bar-given that the court had entertained simi-
lar claims by writ of error coram nobis). Compare Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853,
863-64 (1993) (distinguishing Johnson's situation from that of Herrera on the basis
of available state process) with id. at 877 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Johnson considered the State's past practice only on the question of whether an
independent and adequate state ground existed, not on the question of whether an
Eighth Amendment violation had occurred).
286. Ford, 477 U.S. at 403-04 (plurality opinion); supra text accompanying note
281.
287. -See Brief for Petitioner at 41 n.53, Herrera (No. 91-7328) (faulting clemency as
resting in the hands of the Governor's subordinates).
288. From a different perspective, however, the absence of process at the only rel-
evant time cut in favor of Herrera. Compare supra note 269 (commenting that
Herrera's position may have been even worse than Case's in this regard) with Com-
ment, supra note 249, at 1088 (noting that in Professor Amsterdam's view, Case
suffered a " 'total deprivation of ... process' ").
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sanity, Herrera sought to relitigate the ultimate issue at trial.
The Court could hardly welcome such a broad challenge in any
setting.289 Thus, the defense team, poised for the final effort to
save the client's life, had their work cut out for them.
IV. HERRERA: THE OPINIONS
29°
A. The Majority of Six: Too Little, Too Late
1. The Opinion for the Court
The Chief Justice, writing for himself and four other Justices,
conceded the "elemental appeal" of the argument that the Con-
stitution forbids execution (or indeed, imprisonment) of a person
who is innocent of the crime for which he stands convicted.29'
Yet, he remarked, although our judicial system provides numer-
ous safeguards to the accused, the presumption of innocence
disappears upon rendition of a guilty verdict: "Thus, in the eyes
of the law, petitioner does not come before the Court as one who
is 'innocent,' but on the contrary as one who has been convicted
by due process of law of two brutal murders."292
The opinion then quotes Townsend v. Sain2 9  on the
noncognizability in habeas of bare allegations of actual inno-
cence, based on newly discovered evidence, and Moore v. Demp-
sey294 to the effect that federal courts sit to redress violations
of constitutional rights, not to correct errors of fact. 5 While
289. See supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
290. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). The Chief Justice wrote the
Court's majority opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.
See id Justice O'Connor, with Justice Kennedy, filed a concurrence. Id. at 870
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, did likewise, id.
at 874 (Scalia, J., concurring), and Justice White concurred in the judgment, id. at
875 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun wrote a dissent, in
most of which Justices Stevens and Souter joined. Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
291. Id. at 859.
292. Id. at 860. Chief Justice Rehnquist. proceeded to fault the dissent for
"assum[ing]" the petitioner's innocence in its analysis. Id. at 864 n.6.
293. 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963). See supra text accompanying note 240.
294. 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923) (Holmes, J.). See supra note 178.
295. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 860. Of course, when a petitioner does assert a tradi-
tional claim of right, the conservative majority often insists that she cast doubt upon
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affirming the relevance of innocence,296 it swiftly cabined pre-
vious precedents in the Carrier-Kuhlmann line297 to the proce-
dural forfeiture context: "[Tihis body of our habeas jurisprudence
makes clear that a claim of 'actual innocence' is not itself a con-
stitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional
claim considered on the merits."29 Further, in contrast to the
sufficiency-of-evidence review called for by Jackson v. Virgin-
ia, 99 the type of scrutiny urged by Herrera would be very dis-
ruptive of federalism, according to the Chief Justice, because it
would focus on the accuracy-not the rationality-of the deter-
mination of guilt and demand expansion of the original record:
"Acceptance of this view would presumably require the habeas
court to hear testimony from the witnesses who testified at trial
as well as those who made the statements in the affidavits
which petitioner has presented ....
The majority also voiced concern about the nature of appropri-
ate relief: 'Would it be commutation of petitioner's death sen-
tence, new trial, or unconditional release from imprison-
ment?"39' On the assumption that it .would consist of an order
conditionally freeing the inmate unless the authorities chose to
retry him,0 2 the Chief Justice expressed skepticism that the
her guilt. See infra text accompanying note 350.
296. "This is not to say that our habeas jurisprudence casts a blind eye towards
innocence." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
297. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436 (1986) (plurality opinion); see generally supra text accompanying notes 204-25
(discussing the place of actual innocence in habeas corpus proceedings).
298. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862-63 (emphasis added).
299. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
300. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861. The Chief Justice also worried that the district
court would confront the difficult task of "weigh[ing] the probative value of 'hot' and
'cold' evidence on petitioner's guilt or innocence." Id. at 862.
301. Id. at 862.
302. Id. If the new evidence left no room for doubt of innocence, release ought to
be unconditional. Cf supra note 112 (noting that in the setting of a motion for a
new trial, truly compelling proof may warrant dismissing the indictment). During
oral argument, Herrera's counsel declined to request an ultimate remedy beyond
immunity from execution, see Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863, despite pressure from sev-
eral Justices to explain why, if innocent, he should not be freed from prison. (The
excerpt from the petitioner's argument in the Criminal Law Reporter conveys these
exchanges only obliquely. See Arguments Heard, supra note 10, at 3039-40. I am
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guilt or innocence finding "would be any more exact" on this
round."'3 To the contrary, because time's passage erodes memo-
ry and leads to the disappearance of witnesses, adjudications
become less accurate.0 4
For this reason, he gave short shrift to Herrera's "death is
different" argument. Although the Eighth Amendment requires
enhanced reliability of the process for imposing death, he consid-
ered it "far from clear" that a belated second trial would yield a
more dependable result.3 5  Ford v. Wainwright,3 6  was,
moreover, distinguishable. "[U]nlike the question of guilt or
innocence,.., the issue of sanity is properly considered in
proximity to the execution."303 Here, the former had already
been determined " 'with the high regard for truth' " befitting a
life or death decision.08
Due process, the Court continued, provides no alternative
route for Herrera. Neither history nor current practice supports
the view that his show of innocence entitles him to relief from
his conviction or sentence.0 9 In particular, common law prece-
dent confined motions for a new trial to the term of court in
which a final judgment was entered.3 0 Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs such motions based
on newly discovered evidence, now contains a strictly enforced
two-year limit31 -- applicable in capital as well as regular pro-
ceedings. 12 State practice varies widely.313 In these circum-
also relying, therefore, on my own contemporaneous notes.) In the Court's opinion,
the Chief Justice later noted the illogicality of holding that someone like the peti-
tioner "could not be executed, but that he could spend the rest of his life in prison."
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863.
303. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 863.
306. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 276-81, 285-86.
307. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 863.
308. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (plurality opinion));
see id. at 866 n.13. The Court added that Ford's claim, which went to punishment
rather than guilt, fell more properly than Herrera's within the scope of the Eighth
Amendment. See id& at 863.
309. Id. at 864-66.
310. Id. at 864-65.
311. See id. at 865; supra note 24.
312. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 865. One of the rule's previous versions permitted
such motions by death-sentenced prisoners " 'at any time' " before execution. Id.
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stances, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, "we cannot say that
Texas' refusal to entertain petitioner's newly discovered evidence
eight years after his conviction transgresses... fundamental
fairness."14 Yet according to the Court, Herrera, like others in
his position in every death-sentence jurisdiction, did have one
remaining outlet:" 5 "History shows that the traditional remedy
for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered too
late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive
clemency."
31 6
In a tantalizing conclusion, the majority left open a theoretical
path for future Herreras:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this
case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration
of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the execu-
tion of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal
habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim. But... the threshold showing for such an as-
sumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high."7
Measured against this daunting standard, adopted because of
the need for finality and the fear of petitioner abuse, 8
Herrera clearly came up short. Among other things, his affida-
(citation omitted). An even earlier variation imposed an across-the-board bar of 60
days. Id. Before that, the federal courts adhered to the practice at common law. See
id. at 864-65; supra text accompanying note 310.
313. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 865-66; supra note 24.
314. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 866.
315. See supra text accompanying note 81.
316. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869. The Court described it as the " 'fail safe' " in our
criminal justice system. Id. at 868 (citation omitted). Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
discuss whether, without that possibility, the Court would have taken a different
approach. Cf. id. at 867 (noting that states are not required "to enact a clemency
mechanism"). He did opine that clemency had been granted "frequently" to death-
sentenced prisoners who had demonstrated " 'actual innocence.' " Id. at 868 (citation
omitted). But cf. infra text accompanying notes 364-69 (painting a less rosy picture
of the clemency process).
317. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869 (emphasis added). Presumably (although the opinion
is less than clear on this point), clemency alone would not suffice. Cf id. at 881
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority does not say that the vindication of
petitioner's constitutional rights may be left to executive clemency.").
318. See id., 113 S. Ct. at 869. The majority stated: "Although we are not present-




vits were faulted as hearsay, "eleventh hour," and inconsistent;
while not "without probative value," they could not be viewed
apart from the strong evidence of guilt at trial. 19 Hence, said
the Court, they could not "trigger the sort of constitutional
claim" hypothesized for extreme cases."'
2. The Concurring Opinions.2'
Writing for herself and Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor
emphasized in her separate opinion that, while "the execution of
a legally and factually innocent person would be... constitu-
tionally intolerable," Herrera was, in no sense, innocent. 2 In-
stead, having been duly convicted, he now sought to establish
the right "to yet another judicial proceeding in which to adjudi-
cate his guilt anew."3" The Justice saw no need to resolve the
"sensitive" and "troubling" question he raised because, "[n]o
matter what the Court might say about claims of actual inno-
cence," he could not obtain relief." She then parsed the origi-
nal record as well as the proffered new material to show that
Herrera had surely murdered Officers Rucker and Carrisalez.
With respect to the proof at trial, she especially stressed the
contents of the letter found on Herrera's person at the time of
his arrest; she construed it as a virtual confession. 5 With re-
gard to the affidavits (again described as "eleventh hour," in-
consistent and paling beside the State's evidence3 2 ) she
319. Id. at 869-70. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion goes into the facts in
greater detail. See id. at 871-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
320. Id. at 870.
321. These are treated more summarily than the opinion for the Court.
322. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 871. She concluded her opinion: "If the Constitution's guarantees of fair
procedure and the safeguards of clemency and pardon fulfill their historical mission,
it may never require resolution at all." Id. at 874. I strongly predict otherwise.
325. See icL at 872-73. For a description of the letter, see supra text accompanying
notes 53-54 and note 53.
326. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 872, 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra text ac-
companying note 319. She noted, as had the Chief Justice writing for the majority,
that the petitioner had given "no reasonable explanation for the nearly decade-long
delay." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 872 (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. id. at 869 (majority
opinion) ("[nlo satisfactory explanation has been given"). The petitioner indirectly
suggested a justification in his depiction of a corrupt local society, in which the
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faulted them, above all, for "conveniently blam[ing] a dead
man-someone who will neither contest the allegations nor suf-
fer punishment as a result of them."327 Finally, she criticized
the district court for ordering a stay since Herrera "could not
have obtained relief-or even a hearing-through the state
courts.
3 25
The two other concurring opinions, both brief, were authored
by Justices Scalia and White. The former, joined by Justice
Thomas, would have expressly held that neither the Eighth nor
Fourteenth Amendments affords "a right to demand judicial
consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought
forward after conviction."329 The latter, like Chief Justice
Rehnquist, assumed that even an untimely "persuasive showing
of 'actual innocence' " would render invalid the execution of the
proponent."0 In order to merit relief, however, the Justice stat-
ed, a prisoner must meet the high standard of Jackson v. Virgin-
ia:33 ' he must, at least, demonstrate-based on both the prof-
fered new material and the record before the jury-that "'no
rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.' ,,W32
police endeavored to conceal their own involvement in the drug trade along the
Mexican border. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, 5, 25-26, Herrera (No. 91-7328); see
also Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 859 n.4 (detailing the affidavit filed after the court of
appeals vacated Herrera's stay, in which Raul Jr. alleged that law enforcement offi-
cials, including the sheriff, had told him "not to say what happened on the night of
the shootings and threatened his family").
327. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 872 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
328. Id. at 873. Believing that the judge had not envisioned holding further federal
proceedings, the Justice remarked that, if he had, he surely would have abused his
discretion since the petitioner "failed to make a persuasive showing of actual inno-
cence." Id. at 873-74.
329. Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring). He wished to spare the lower federal
courts the burden of dealing with Herrera claims which, "it can confidently be pre-
dicted, will become routine and even repetitive." Id. at 875. He also regarded it as
"improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opinion requires
would fail to produce an executive pardon." Id.
330. Id. at 875 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
331. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
332. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 875 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324).
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B. The Dissenting Three: Better Late than Never
Writing for himself in addition to Justices Stevens and Souter,
Justice Blackmuin would have held that both the Eighth3 " and
Fourteenth3  Amendments "forbidl the execution of a person
who has been validly convicted and sentenced but who, nonethe-
less, can prove his innocence with newly discovered evi-
dence."335  Relegating Townsend's contrary statement 36  to
"distant dictum,"33 7 he also would have defined a "truly persua-
sive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after tri-
al"338-- the majority's assumed standard for a constitutionally
cognizable claim 3 9 -as a showing by the prisoner that she "is
probably actually innocent."30 Some of his points are noted be-
low.
First, he stressed, the protection of the Eighth Amendment
does not end at the time of judgment."' Ford v. Wain-
wright,42 for instance, recognized that subsequent develop-
ments may entitle a capital defendant to further proceedings:
"[Tihe legitimacy of punishment is inextricably intertwined with
guilt."343 He disagreed with the Chief Justice31 that, unlike
sanity, guilt or innocence should not be considered after trial,
since new evidence impugning the conviction may surface belat-
edly.345 The question, moreover, "is not whether a second trial
333. See id. at 876-78 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "I think it is crystal clear that
the execution of an innocent person is 'at odds with contemporary standards of fair-
ness and decency.' " Id. at 876 (quoting Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465
(1984)).
334. See id. at 878-79 (allowing the execution of an innocent person violates sub-
stantive due process because it amounts to the ultimate arbitrary imposition).
335. Id. at 876.
336. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963).
337. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 880 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra text accompa-
nying note 240.
338. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
339. See supra text accompanying note 317.
340. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 883 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 877.
342. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
343. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 878 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Spaziano v. Florida,
468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). See generally supra
note 172 and accompanying text (discussing guilt-phase protections in capital cases).
344. See supra text accompanying note 307.
345. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 877 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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would be more reliable than the first but whether, in light of
new evidence, the result of the first trial is sufficiently reliable
for the State to carry out a death sentence."346 Second, he
deemed the Court's opinion especially "perverse" in light of the
thrust of recent habeas jurisprudence. 47  The Carrier-
Kuhlmann line of precedent, which shifted the focus of federal
review from legal rights to factual innocence, could not be
cabined to abusive, successive, or defaulted claims.348 Rejecting
the majority's "gateway" approach,34' he insisted that the rea-
soning of these decisions plainly encompassed substantive claims
of innocence as well. The opposite conclusion was, in addition,
result oriented and disingenuous:
[H] aving held that a prisoner who is incarcerated in violation
of the Constitution must show he is actually innocent to
obtain relief, the majority would now hold that a prisoner
who is actually innocent must show a constitutional violation
to obtain relief. The only principle that would appear to rec-
oncile these two positions is the principle that habeas relief
should be denied whenever possible.350
Third, enlarging on the subject of remedy, the Justice stated
that allegations such as Herrera's "can and should be heard in
state court."3 51 If the State provided a forum, the defendant
346. Id. at 878. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment, he engaged the ma-
jority in a fairly opaque discussion about whether the latter had misinterpreted
Herrera's claim "as raising a procedural rather than a substantive due process chal-
lenge." Id. Compare id. at 878-79 & n.5 (arguing for substantive due process anal-
ysis) with id. at 864 n.6 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that the dissent's analysis rests
on the faulty assumption that the petitioner is innocent). Because it is tangential to
my analysis, I will not develop it further.
347. Id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
348. Id.
349. See supra text accompanying note 298. Concomitantly, he repudiated the
chance of clemency as wholly inadequate to safeguard constitutional rights: "The vin-
dication of rights guaranteed by the Constitution has never been made to turn on
the unreviewable discretion of an executive official or administrative tribunal."
Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id. at 876 n.1
(showing that innocent people may be executed despite existence of clemency pro-
cess).
350. Id. at 880-81.
351. Id. at 881.
1004
1994] GATEWAY OF INNOCENCE 1005
would have to exhaust its procedures 52 before resorting to fed-
eral court-where findings of fact would be entitled to the usual
presumption of correctness. 5 ' But if the State failed to do so
and the petition raised questions of fact, as in this case, the
habeas judge was obliged to hold an evidentiary hearing."4 To
prevail on the merits, the inmate would need to demonstrate
probable actual innocence.355 The dissenters deemed this stan-
dard tougher than the Carrier-Kuhlmann test : in their view,
it laid upon the petitioner the burden of proving his
innocence-not just showing "there probably would be a reason-
able doubt" about his guilt.357
352. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1988).
353. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(1988) (providing that in most circumstances, "the burden shall rest upon the appli-
cant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State
court was erroneous"); Wright & Sofaer, supra note 242, at 984-95; see also infra
text accompanying notes 437-38 (discussing deference to state fact finding). See gen-
erally 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 28.2 (1988 & Supp. 1992) (supplying an over-
view of the pertinent doctrine).
354. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 881-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Townsend v.
San, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963)).
355. See supra text accompanying notes 338-40.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 208-25. For this reason, an applicant, like
Herrera himself, on his second round of habeas proceedings could not be barred for
abuse of the writ by McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), which applied the
Carrier-Kuhlmann standard to new-claim successive petitions. See supra text accom-
panying notes 221-23; see also Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
357. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Kuhlmann formula-
tion, which incorporates Judge Friendly's language on "reasonable doubt," see supra
text accompanying notes 214-20 and note 220, more clearly supports this interpre-
tation than the alternate Carrier formulation, see supra text accompanying note 213,
which facially resembles Justice Blackmun's ostensibly more demanding test. Indeed,
only the year before, the Justice himself had joined an opinion in Sawyer v. Whit-
ley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2531-32 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), con-
struing Carrier to call for the strict "more likely than not test"--essentially identical
to his suggested Herrera standard-widely employed to assess motions for a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence. See id. at 2531. As I noted earlier, howev-
er, see supra note 225, Carrier and Kuhlmann are generally treated as alike in their
purport. In Herrera, the Justice explained, this higher standard was warranted by
the evaporation of the original presumption of innocence after a valid conviction and
sentence and the frequently long delay in uncovering new evidence which, because of
the hardship in retrying a successful petitioner, might render the post-trial hearing
"the final word on whether the defendant may be punished." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at
882 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 22.1b, at 309
(1988) (noting that ordinarily, the habeas petitioner bears the civil burden of proof
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Finally, with respect to Herrera, Justice Blackmun wanted to
remand to the district court so that it might decide in the first
place whether or not to order a hearing."' Criticizing the
majority's critique of Herrera's hearsay affidavits, the Justice
again faulted their haste to deny relief: "It makes no sense...
to impugn the reliability of petitioner's evidence on the ground
that its credibility has not been tested when the reason its credi-
bility has not been tested is that petitioner's habeas proceeding
has been truncated by the Court of Appeals and now by this
Court.""9 In a bitter peroration not joined by the other dissent-
ers, Justice Blackmun voiced his continuing reservations about
the validity of capital punishment under the Court's hands-off
regime.5 °
V. A GATEWAY TO SOMEWHERE
A. "Let's Go to the Videotape"
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy inquired of counsel for the
State whether it would violate the Eighth Amendment to exe-
by a preponderance of the evidence); cf Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 878 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("[Ilt is far from clear that a State will seek to retry the rare prisoner
who prevails on a claim of actual innocence . . . ."). At the same time, he rejected
Sawyer's very tough criterion for innocence of the death penalty in the procedural
forfeiture context-a defense " 'show[ing] by clear and convincing evidence that but
for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the [defendant]
eligible for the death penalty.' " Id. at 882 n.6 (quoting Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2515).
The Court developed it "for prisoners who are concededly guilty of capital crimes"
Id. But cf Cornell v. Nix, 976 F.2d 376, 381 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (extending
heightened Sawyer standard to habeas challenges to convictions), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1820 (1993).
358. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 876 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The district court could
summarily dismiss the action only if (unlike here) " 'it plainly appear[ed] from the
face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner [was] not enti-
tled to relief.' " See id. at 881-82, 884 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4 (from the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts)); Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1977). The dissent believed that the Villarreal affidavit
alone, see supra text accompanying notes 59-61, raised questions that could not "be
resolved simply by examining the affidavits and the petition." Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at
884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In general, he stated, "the court charged with decid-
ing such a claim should make a case-by-case determination about the reliability of
the newly discovered evidence under the circumstances." Id. at 883.
359. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
360. See id.; supra text accompanying note 35.
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cute a death-sentenced prisoner who produced a videotape show-
ing someone else committing the murder. Amazingly, she re-
plied: "No."..' The majority, ultimately, took it on faith that
such convincing evidence of innocence would inevitably yield a
pardon." 2 Like the dissenters,"3 I am less sanguine. To de-
velop the Justice's hypothetical, a film may raise serious ques-
tions of authenticity calling for resolution in a forum suited to
determining disputed facts: a courthouse, not a Governor's man-
sion. Furthermore, the executive branch has, at times, denied
clemency even in cases of strong doubts about a death-sentenced
prisoner's guilt.3
One's readiness to trust the inmate's fate to the vagaries of
extrajudicial grace may depend, in part, on one's perception of
the incidence of wrongful capital convictions and of their timely
remediation. Among other things, the Chief Justice and Justice
Blackmun conducted a minor footnote skirmish over the merits
of a recent study finding that twenty-three innocent people had
been put to death in this century in the United States. 65 But
whether or not its precise conclusion withstands scrutiny,36
capital litigators can attest to the accuracy of the authors' asser-
tion that, however low the chances of convicting the innocent,
361. Arguments Heard, supra note 10, at 3040.
362. See, e.g., supra note 329 (giving Justice Scalia's opinion to this effect).
363. See supra note 349.
364. See, e.g., supra note 244 (discussing Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir.
1938)); see also Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 876 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
365. Compare Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 868 n.15 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (remarking that
"scholars have taken issue with [the study]") with id. at 876 n.1 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (calling the work "impressive"). The subject of the Justices' sparring is a
lengthy article by Professors Bedau and Radelet. See Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L.
Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21
(1987).
366. Two attorneys, then employed by the Justice Department, attacked the Bedau-
Radelet piece shortly after its publication. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G.
Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 121 (1988). The authors defended their methodology and findings in a brief
rebuttal. See Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Re-
ply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988). Subsequently, they pub-
lished a book expanding on their earlier work. See MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN
SPITE OF INNOcENcE (1992). As they note in the original article, the pertinent em-
pirical research is sparse. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 365, at 23-26; see also
id. at 25 & nn.20 & 22 (listing some previous studies).
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"the odds of innocent prisoners-once convicted-being able to
marshal the resources essential to proving their innocence are
lower still." "7 We cannot know how many mistakes are literal-
ly buried.368 The fact that we read with increasing frequency of
death row inmates released from prison surely does not warrant
complacency when hairbreadth reprieves are all too common.36 9
In the last analysis, judgments concerning the risk of errone-
ous executions relate to values more than (largely unknowable)
numbers. In noting the differences among the opinions in
Herrera, one should not slight significant areas of agreement.
Five Justices wrote explicitly that the Constitution forbids put-
ting a guiltless person to death; unsurprisingly, no one ex-
pressed the opposite view. 7° Significantly, too, while only three
would have held that on an appropriate demonstration of inno-
cence a death-sentenced prisoner possesses the right to judicial
relief, all but two were willing to assume it.3 1' Although I
think the majority erred in placing too heavy a thumb on the
scale on the side of finality-influenced, perhaps, by what they
regarded as bad facts 72 -and in tacitly underrating the
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, I believe that only Justices
367. RADELET ET AL., supra note 366, at 271-72. See generally supra text accompa-
nying notes 121-28 (detailing the particular problems of death-sentenced prisoners).
368. See RADELET ET AL., supra note 366, at 272; see generally Freedman, supra
note 128, at 315 (warning that the "danger of wrongful execution is chillingly real").
369. See, e.g., RADELET ET AL., supra note 366, at 275-76 & n.* (listing more than
two dozen cases of eleventh-hour salvation); Tabak & Lane, supra note 124, at 102-
03 (Joseph Green Brown came within 15 hours of death); id. at 107 (Ronald Monroe
received a stay three days before his execution date); supra note 100 (Randall Dale
Adams won a reprieve within three days of his execution).
370. See supra text accompanying note 322 (Justices O'Connor and Kennedy); supra
text accompanying notes 333-34 (Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter); cf supra
text accompanying notes 291-92 (Chief Justice Rehnquist, with Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) (opinion for the Court, admitting the "elemental ap-
peal" of this proposition).
371. Compare Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 871 (O'Connor, J, concurring) (discussing this
aspect of the Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun opinions) with supra text accompany-
ing note 329 (noting the contrary sentiment voiced in the Scalia and Thomas opin-
ion).
372. The victim's status as a policeman, combined with Herrera's drug trafficking,
may have cast a subliminal pall over the petitioner's legal claim. Possibly, a more




Scalia and Thomas approached the matter cavalierly. I also re-
gard the generic issue posed by Herrera as genuinely troubling.
Setting aside my opposition to capital punishment, I concede
that seeking to overturn a judgment valid when rendered impli-
cates weighty government interests. For these reasons, I cannot
muster Justice Blackmun's sense of outrage.
Yet the State, as well as the inmate, ought to have the stron-
gest concern for vindicating well-founded claims of innocence.
Responsible officials, ethically, cannot wish the problem of inno-
cence away, especially where human life is at stake. Beyond
that, enforcing local substantive law through reliable verdicts of
guilt constitutes the raison d'etre of any criminal justice system.
The latter insight suggests the wisdom-in this area, above all
others-of a state court resolution of a complaint such as
Herrera's.
In the following pages, I indicate in general terms a possible
constitutional strategy toward that end. Not fleshed out in great
detail (in part, because the action agenda has shifted from the
Court to Congress and local legislatures), the rest of this Article
amounts to more of a sketch than a portrait. Whether or not the
proposed approach would have profited this petitioner or,
through dicta, litigants to come, it might at least have allowed a
fairly hard case to avoid making bad law.
B. Furnishing a Federal Key to the Statehouse Door7
1. The Rationale
Perhaps because of the imprecision of the petitioner's request-
ed relief,374 the Court's opinion focused mainly on the ramifica-
tions for habeas of a victory for Herrera. " 'Federal courts are
not forums in which to relitigate state trials,' ""' Chief Justice
Rehnquist announced. In his estimation, few rulings would dis-
373. In this Section, my analysis draws heavily on Wright & Sofaer, supra note
242, passim.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
375. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887
(1983)).
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rupt the federal system more than "habeas review of free-stand-
ing claims of actual innocence. 376
Given the majority's recent attitude toward the writ,377 one
might readily discount those statements as merely reflexive
hostility to habeas. In many cases, as I myself have commented
elsewhere, linkage of an asserted right with the disliked federal
remedy has tended to doom or dilute the former.378 But irre-
spective of possible bias, the Chief Justice's words ring true to a
certain extent. For a number of reasons, allocating Herrera
claims to state post-conviction courts is a far superior solution to
processing them in the district courts. Further, although the
habeas doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies reflects an un-
derstandable preference for intra-systemic correction of er-
ror, 79 wherever possible, the arguments favoring such a course
have special weight in the present setting.
First and foremost, it bears repeating, fact finding on guilt
and innocence comprises "the central focus and purpose" of local
criminal prosecutions.38 ° Thus, in Professor Liebman's words,
"[tihere hardly can be a greater slight to the presumption of
competence of state courts ... than to empower the federal
courts to reconsider the validity of the guilt determinations that
state courts routinely make."38' Federal courts have only limit-
ed expertise in the definition of state offenses and the applica-
tion of ancillary doctrines (such as rules requiring corrobora-
tion 8 2), making evaluation of this type of evidence relatively
harder for the federal judiciary. 83 Further, even though dis-
376. Id.
377. See supra text accompanying note 185 and note 177 and accompanying text.
378. See generally Berger, supra note 179, at 98-99 (arguing that dislike of habeas
"may be exerting a general downward pull on the law").
379. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988). In the words of Justice White, "ensuring that
full factual development of a claim takes place in state court channels the resolution
of the claim to the most appropriate forum. The state court is the appropriate forum
for resolution of factual issues in the first instance .... " Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
112 S. Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992).
380. See LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 26.4, at 389 (Supp. 1992).
381. 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 2.2c, at 17 n.61 (1988); cf Patchel, supra note
175, at 1024-25 n.497 (discussing operation of the innocence standard in the forfei-
ture context).
382. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAV §§ 60.22, 60.50 (Consol. 1986).
383. See Rosenberg, supra note 194, at 608. Unlike Herrera, not every post-convic-
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trict judges will likely possess some familiarity with the laws of
their own jurisdictions,"s their time is better spent deciding
more broadly significant questions involving constitutional
rights.385 Allegations of innocence, however key to the individu-
al death row inmate, lack any national importance. 86 Finally,
prisoners raising contentions that do not impugn their guilt
arguably have the most need for protection from Article III
courts,37 with their greater insulation from the intense po-
litical pressures so endemic to capital cases."88
How, then, might the Court have relegated Herrera conten-
tions to a state judicial forum? After all, through its thirty-day
limitations period, Texas literally had given the petitioner short
shrift. Notably, many other jurisdictions would have done like-
wise.38 Imposing a duty upon the State to hear his complaint
would have meant not that a month's cutoff "was too short...
but that applying an 8-year limit to [him] would be."39 In the
real world, as I have pointed out already, any rigid time bar to
tion challenge based on newly discovered evidence will pose a-simple "who done it"
scenario. See generally supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the com-
plexities of the notion of "innocence").
384. They already must review Jackson claims. See supra text accompanying notes
77-78.
385. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 471 n.7 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). As previously mentioned, see supra note 353, prior state court findings of fact
bearing on constitutional claims receive only deferential review. See also Liebman,
Apocalypse, supra note 175, at 2094 (remarking that factual issues have, from the
beginning of habeas review, "been singled out as singularly unworthy of habeas
corpus relitigation"); 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 2.2c, at 13 (1988) (noting that
"habeas corpus is not a writ of error designed to cure factually erroneous convic-
tions") (footnote omitted); cf Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2494-97 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that habeas review is plenary as
to questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact).
386. See Liebman, Apocalypse, supra note 175, at 2056; Patchel, supra note 175, at
1030 n.512.
387. See 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 2.2c, at 14-15 (1988); Patchel, supra note
175, at 1030 n.512 (citing RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsIS AND RE-
FORM 186-87 (1985)).
388. See Berger, supra note 37, at 1085-86 n.107; see also supra text accompanying
notes 142-46 (discussing such pressures in the clemency setting). That being said, I
stress that one should not underestimate the general hostility toward capital defen-
dants-at trial and after judgment--which threatens their rights in any forum.
389. See generally supra note 24 (summarizing the relevant time limits).
390. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 873 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence will
probably prevent the bulk of potential death row movants from
having their claims heard by a state court.39' Only blanket in-
validation of such barriers would, therefore, accomplish the goal
of having these matters adjudicated locally. I now proceed to
develop the constitutional argument in support of that result.
2. The Legal Route and Its Ramifications392
At this point, I can affirm without much fear of refutation
that the Eighth Amendment forbids executing a guiltless per-
son.39 The abstract substantive right to avoid execution if in-
nocent means nothing in concrete terms, however, unless there
exists a correlative right to establish innocence before a court at
a requisite level of probability-and to do so after judgment.
Simply put, absent the latter, the former would pose a classic
instance of a right without a remedy. To avert that outcome, I
would hold that the Eighth Amendment obligates states to en-
tertain motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evi-
dence, by death-sentenced prisoners asserting innocence, with-
out regard to generally applicable time limitations.94 Admit-
391. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28. In addition, I know of no constitu-
tional basis for drawing the line at a set number of months or years.
392. Like Justice Blackmun, I reserve for a later day questions, substantive and
procedural, surrounding analogous claims by defendants who have been sentenced to
life imprisonment or to lengthy terms of years. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 877 n.2
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Such an attitude need not, as some have implied, connote
callousness toward those inmates. See Bass v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1157 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1983). The fashioning of new constitutional doctrine often, quite properly, occurs
incrementally. Without apology, I do, moreover, think death is different-in the origi-
nal sense intended. See Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 877 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (ci-
tations omitted); compare supra text accompanying notes 152-57 with supra text
accompanying notes 164-65. Unlike Justice Blackmun, however, I will not make a
separate Fourteenth Amendment argument in support of my position. It adds noth-
ing, in the case of a death-sentenced prisoner, to an Eighth Amendment analysis.
And insofar as the Court looks to history or even current practice in deciding what
process is due a criminal defendant, the Herrera claimant has to lose. See supra text
accompanying notes 309-14; cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (enunciat-
ing a more generous balancing test for application in certain civil contexts).
393. Teague notwithstanding, I believe that the Court could have proclaimed this
right in a habeas setting. Either it is not a new rule or it falls within the rarely
applied exception for conduct beyond the State's power to proscribe or punish. See
generally supra text accompanying notes 198-203 and note 201.
394. Again, I believe that this new rule should constitute an exception to Teague
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tedly, as we have seen, 9 ' recent dicta from the Court cast a
pall over the notion of any constitutional entitlement to ade-
quate post-conviction process. Yet exempting Herrera claims
from the negative implications of cases like Finley and
Giarratano would hardly reflect the "extreme position"396 that
every constitutional right compels a remedy for violations. For
one thing, when a state acts (or threatens to act) coercively to
infringe such rights, it may generally have a duty to grant relief
notwithstanding otherwise operative limits on its remedial
processes.397 Further, given the highly disturbing nature of
these particular claims"9 ' and the fact that they cannot be re-
dressed at trial or on appeal (or often, until long afterward), the
argument in favor of mandating state corrective procedures
seems very strong in the circumstances. 99  The Eighth
Amendment's core concern for reliability survives the verdict, as
Justice Blackmun emphasized, 4°0 and as even the Chief Justice
grudgingly conceded by leaving open the possibility that "a truly
persuasive" showing of actual innocence after judgment would
since it lays down a "procedureD without which the likelihood of an accurate convic-
tion is seriously diminished." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989) (plurality
opinion). See supra text accompanying note 201; see also Sanders v. Sullivan, 900
F.2d 601, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that when the "state's constitutional violation
is the preservation of a conviction despite a credible recantation of material testimo-
ny," either Teague does not apply or the quoted exception does).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 257-61.
396. See Woolhandler, supra note 175, at 635-36.
397. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Florida Alcohol & Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18
(1990) (holding that where a state required the payment of an unconstitutional tax
before review of the tax's validity, due process obliged it to furnish a meaningful op-
portunity for a refund); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (holding that a
county that levied taxes on Indians in violation of the Indians' constitutional rights
and obtained the money by coercive means, could not permissibly deny a refund on
the ground of lack of authority to pay it). Such relief may be prospective, see Gen-
eral Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), and, in this context, obviously must be.
398. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 871 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
399. See generally Freedman, supra note 128:
[Wihatever the prospect of its current acceptance by the courts, a strong
legal argument exists that the execution of a prisoner violates the eighth
amendment's requirements of a comprehensive, reliable, individualized
sentencing determination where newly-acquired evidence, never considered
by the sentencing jury, creates a reasonable doubt as to guilt.
Id. at 319 n.22 (citation omitted).
400. See supra text accompanying notes 341-46.
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render an execution invalid.40 ' Insistence that a judge close her
eyes to an exculpatory videotape or stop her ears to a third
party's convincing confession mocks the Court's professed com-
mitment to "super-accuracy" in capital punishment.4 2
Happily, the universal availability of motions for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence 48 pretermits the vexing
401. See supra text accompanying note 317.
402. See generally Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:
Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980) (discussing the Su-
preme Court's position that the Eighth Amendment requires procedural safeguards in
capital cases which result in a kind of "super due process"). One branch of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence looks to whether a challenged practice comports with
" 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' " See
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). A majority of the Court believes that "[t]he clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted
by the country's legislatures"; it also considers, where applicable, the "actions of
sentencing juries." Id. at 331. Three current members of the Court (the Chief Jus-
tice, and Justices Kennedy and Scalia) deem those sources of data exclusive, while
three others (Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Blackmun) hold that the Court also
has a duty to conduct its own independent proportionality analysis. Compare Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-70 & n.1, 377-79 (1989) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Kennedy, JJ.) with id. at 381-82 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment) and id. at 382-83 (Brennan, J.,
concurring, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). At least Justices
Blackmun and Stevens will, moreover, survey a wider range of evidence, including
public opinion polls, the views of organizations with relevant expertise, "and the
choices of governments elsewhere in the world." Id. at 384. Plainly, if a headcount of
statutes governing motions for new trials, including time bars, were to determine the
Eighth Amendment status of Herrera claims, my approach could not prevail. See
supra note 24 and text accompanying note 389; see, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 158 (1987) (stating that where only a few jurisdictions reject the possibility of
death for felony murder, absent an intent to kill, the Constitution does not mandate
the minority's position). The outcome of a broader-based examination would be less
certain.
These considerations, however, should not detract from my argument. The Court
has applied the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine almost exclusively to claims
of substantive immunity from death. See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. 361 (16- or 17-
year-old murderers); Penry, 492 U.S. 302 (retarded persons); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982) (felony murderers who did not themselves kill or attempt or intend
to kill). I know of only a single instance in which this line of precedent was used
(without discussion) to assess an asserted procedural right, jury sentencing in capital
cases. Significantly, the Court held against the defendant despite the strong state
consensus favoring the practice. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). Final-
ly, in Herrera itself, the majority rejected the petitioner's contentions without such
analysis, while "counting heads" as part of their due process inquiry. See supra text
accompanying notes 311-13.
403. See supra text accompanying note 81. As previously noted, Arkansas tempo-
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question whether a state can be required to create a forum for
the enforcement of federal rights.4 4 Indeed, with regard to the
posited constitutional entitlement to a belated state hearing on
such a motion, it basically merges with the question whether
that "remedial right" exists.4 5 If it does not, the substantive
Eighth Amendment right would (as Chief Justice Rehnquist
assumed) entail vindication in habeas proceedings.4 6 I believe,
as I signaled earlier, that this alternative is inferior to a consti-
tutional rule that the states must furnish a Herrera proce-
dure.4"' Because my reasoning in support of a locally focused
rarily repealed its general post-conviction statute. See supra note 273. But it did not
repeal its law authorizing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-130(c)(6) (Michie 1987).
404. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 378 & n.1 (1990). While Texas' bar has
been construed as 'jurisdictional," see supra note 21, that designation is not dispos-
itive. In Howlett, which involved a § 1983 action against a school board filed in a
Florida circuit court, Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous bench:
The fact that a rule is denominated jurisdictional does not provide a
court an excuse to avoid the obligation to enforce federal law if the rule
does not reflect the concerns of power over the person and competence
over the subject matter that jurisdictional rules are designed to pro-
tect . . . . The force of the Supremacy Clause is not so weak that it can
be evaded by mere mention of the word "jurisdiction."
Id. at 381-83. No reason exists to surmise that the Texas rule stems from the sorts
of considerations mentioned in the quoted passage. Cf id. at 383 (stating that if the
State's label were dispositive, the State could overrule the decision in Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), see infra note 405).
Further, so long as a state system generally entertains motions for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, it could not refuse to do so in cases where the
defendant's right arises under federal law, see Howlett, 496 U.S. at 356; McKnett v.
St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934) (Federal Employers' Liability Act),
because, for example, the courts or legislature deemed applications by death row
inmates more likely to be frivolous. See Howlett, 496 U.S. at 379-80; cf supra note
318 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of probability
of abuse).
405. If it does, a state could not invoke its time bar as an "adequate state ground"
to preclude federal review of a dismissed Herrera claim. A procedural rule that, on
its face or as applied, violates the Constitution is naturally inadequate for this pur-
pose, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 249, at 604-06, as is even one that, al-
though not unconstitutional, evades or unduly interferes with federal rights. See id.
at 608; see also Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 399 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting);
cf Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (holding that when a § 1983 action is filed
in state court, state notice-of-claim law-in part, a statute of limitations-is preempt-
ed because it conflicts with remedial aims of federal law).
406. See supra text accompanying note 317.
407. See supra text accompanying notes 380-88, 394. Significantly, the respondent
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solution to the Herrera problem relies heavily on considerations
of comity and federalism, I should in candor acknowledge that
forcing the states to adjudicate claims of innocence by death row
inmates might be seen as a greater intrusion than simply ac-
cording a federal hearing when they do not.40 8 First and fore-
most, any compulsion, by definition, infringes on the state's
autonomy.4 9 Then, too, in the latter case, the prisoner only ob-
tains her freedom in the event she wins on the merits; in the
former, denial of state corrective process that the Court has
deemed imperative results in her release from custody.410 For
that reason (if not out of deference alone), a state very likely
would comply with a federal mandate to entertain this type of
in Herrera agreed. As a fallback position, the warden contended that the Court
should announce a constitutional entitlement to a state post-conviction proce-
dure--"such as an untimely motion for a new trial"--in preference to requiring a
"federal habeas court to directly adjudicate guilt or innocence." See Respondent's
Brief at 40, Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (No. 91-7328). For a useful
summary of factors bearing on the choice between a federal "hearing to correct unac-
ceptable fact-finding caused by deficient adjudications of federal rights or a constitu-
tional rule invalidating the deficiency," see Wright & Sofaer, supra note 242, at 919.
The reader should bear in mind that the ensuing discussion, which focuses largely
on state interests, compares only those two options-not the third option, effectively
adopted by the Court, of providing no redress at all.
408. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 153, at 492 (asserting that once a habeas court
decides that the state corrective process is inadequate, determining the federal claim
itself constitutes a "less abrasive" course); Sandalow, supra note 249, at 215 (arguing
that the Court cannot reduce friction resulting from the federal intervention by mak-
ing states furnish post-conviction procedures for hearing inmates' federal claims); cf
Comment, supra note 249, at 1091 ("ITihe Supreme Court should decide that avail-
ability of federal habeas corpus renders unnecessary insistence that a state court
expand the scope of its collateral relief.") (footnote omitted).
409. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 242, at 900-01.
410. Id. at 908; see also Sandalow, supra note 249, at 210. But the discharge order
might be conditional-avoidable, that is, if the State then furnished a proper reme-
dy. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (granting an order of release
subject to retrial, where the state court erroneously had failed to conduct an inquiry
into the defendant's competency); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (granting
an order of release subject to retrial, where state court had applied an incorrect
constitutional standard in determining a confession's voluntariness). Although a habe-
as court may order appropriately limited corrective action, see Wright & Sofaer,
supra note 242, at 904-05 & n.36, I agree with the Chief Justice that merely lifting
the sentence of death does not suffice, in logic or fairness, as relief for an innocent
capital defendant. See supra note 302; cf Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 395-96
(1964) (granting an order of release subject to the state court's after-the-fact hearing
on the confession's voluntariness).
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motion41 and, therefore, would have to assume some burden of
marginal workload.412
While reasonable people may disagree, I remain firm in the
view that my proposal maximizes respect for the states. In let-
ting their judges "off the hook," the Court avoids the friction
stemming from the "coercion of state tribunals only by opening
the gate to even more irritating situations."4 3 As previously
noted, empowering federal courts to dispose of the central ques-
tion of guilt or innocence would constitute a major slight to the
state judiciary. 414 The fact that a state can choose to authorize
local courts to pass on prisoners' Herrera claims and, thus, pre-
vent this slur on its judges as well as loss of control over a core
criminal justice function does not necessarily mean that impos-
ing a duty to do so thwarts state interests. To the contrary, I
think it fair to conclude that the long-run balance of inter-
ests-state, federal, and death row inmates'--inclines toward
the course which I recommend.415
That judgment rests heavily on the latitude I would extend to
particular states to shape the contours of their remedy,41 6 so
411. See Wright & Sofaer, supra note 242, at 901, 908. At least as regards the
Court's own mandate, one can anticipate states' obedience, see Sandalow, supra note
249, at 234, although "[tihe possibility that a state court would ignore the Court's
directions upon remand is not imaginary." Comment, supra note 249, at 1091 n.55
(citing Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945), on remand, 22 N.W.2d 136 (Neb. 1946)).
412. That burden is hard to assess; I do not consider it onerous. To be sure, three
states (California, Florida, and Texas) currently have over 300 persons on death row.
Yet most jurisdictions have far fewer; several, indeed, have under 10. See NAACP
LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. 487-517 (Summer 1993). Notwith-
standing the litigious habits of capital defendants, in many places only a handful
will probably file Herrera claims in a given year.
413. Note, supra note 249, at 1150.
414. See supra text accompanying note 381; cf Kelman, supra note 256, at 68 (im-
posing a duty on state judges to hear constitutional claims by prisoners would be a
"vote of confidence" in the state judiciary). Notably, habeas courts have been loathe
to order state courts to conduct hearings on federal claims. See, e.g., Hull v. Free-
man, 932 F.2d 159, 170 n.9 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that "if an evidentiary hearing is
necessary in a federal habeas case . . . , it should be held in federal district court,
rather than state court"). See generally 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 7.1b, at 69
n.44 (1988) (citing cases), There are, however, occasional exceptions to the rule. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. McQueen v. Wangelin, 527 F.2d 579, 581-82 (8th Cir.
1975) (holding that the district court's remand to state court of habeas action was
an exercise of discretion within the district court's power).
415. See supra text accompanying notes 379-88.
416. Cf Wright & Sofaer, supra note 242, at 918 (arguing that state autonomy is
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long as it remains open to death-sentenced prisoners without
regard to passage of time. For example, a state could properly
entrust to the judge (or, alternatively, to a new jury) the task of
deciding whether a material witness lied417 and define the pre-
cise showing needed to prevail on the merits of the claim, as by
fixing the level of confidence to be instilled in the finder of
fact.418 The sole further constraint which I currently consider
vital is abrogation of strict "due diligence" requirements as ap-
plied to Herrera movants.41 s Because of my preference for rath-
er broad local autonomy in the area,420 I would impose it with
"not seriously limited" by Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), because the Court
did "not require any specific type of procedure").
417. See supra note 101.
418. But its discretion would not be boundless. A state may not place undue bur-
dens on federal rights. See supra note 405. I do not think that the movant could be
compelled to prove her innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, to give one instance of
a forbiddingly high standard. By the same token, I would reject the related test of
whether any rational fact finder could pronounce the defendant guilty of the offense
on the sum of the evidence, old and new. Justice White's Herrera concurrence urged
this approach, see supra text accompanying notes 331-32, which is also embodied in
the relevant provision of the pending crime bill. See S. 1441, supra note 45, § 6.
Justice Blackmun's suggested standard of probable actual innocence, see supra text
accompanying notes 338-40, however, appears sensible. I am not now prepared to
say if a higher standard should pass muster in this context; it would likelier be jns-
tified if applied to a claim of sentencing innocence. Cf supra note 213 (describing
Sawyer's combined rationality and clear and convincing evidence test); S. 1441, supra
note 45, § 6 (looking to whether any rational fact finder "would have found an ag-
gravating circumstance or other condition of eligibility").
In general, I would note that I have qualms about extending the putative
Herrera right to allegations of innocence of death. At least insofar as these may
involve complex or value-laden questions, they do not readily lend themselves to the
format of a new trial motion founded on newly discovered evidence. See, e.g., Evans
v. Muncy, 916 F.2d 163, 165-66 (4th Cir.) (rejecting a prisoner's attempt to present
new evidence of post-sentencing good behavior, which purportedly cast doubt on his
future dangerousness), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 927 (1990). But cf Scott v. Dugger, 604
So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992) (allowing the defendant to attack collaterally a death sentence
as disproportionate, based on an equally guilty cohort's later-imposed life sentence).
Their inclusion also would increase greatly the burdensomeness of the process, see
Ledewitz, supra note 175, at 446-47, thereby potentially biasing judges even against
those defendants asserting innocence of the crime.
419. But cf Friendly, supra note 175, at 159 n.87 (endorsing due diligence re-
quirements for collateral attacks on guilt).
420. Cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 427 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that beyond a few basic requirements,
"the States should have substantial leeway" to devise procedures for pre-execution
assessment of sanity).
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some reluctance. Yet the special problems of capital defen-
dants-above all, ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and
lack of counsel in collateral proceedings42 -- make clear that to
sanction this otherwise reasonable limit would, in the real
world, scuttle the right. So unless the prisoner deliberately with-
held422 evidence of innocence from the trial court, I would not
permit the State to bar her post-conviction challenge. Finally,
whatever the procedure chosen, it should comport with basic
justice.
It remains, still, ,to sketch the projected role of habeas in a
regime of constitutionally mandated state Herrera processes.
That role should be very restricted. If, as expected, the State
entertains the inmate's motion,4" a compelling showing on her
behalf ought to put an end to the matter with an order for a new
trial or, in some cases, immediate release.4 Yet losing defen-
dants, irrespective of the strength of their allegations, will
doubtless seek a second shot at obtaining relief. Nonetheless,
under Townsend v. Sain4" (which governs the right to a fed-
eral evidentiary hearing42 ) and the "intertwined" section
421. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23, 126.
422. This subjective bad faith standard is drawn from the superseded tests for pro-
cedural default and abuse of the writ. See supra text accompanying notes 207-08
and note 223; Freedman, supra note 128, at 322 & n.37. Herrera had implicitly
argued that no type of defense misconduct in litigation should later preclude a death
row inmate from collaterally attacking guilt. See supra note 120. Even apart from
the practical issues regarding lawyering in capital cases, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 121-23, objective standards strike me as inappropriate to apply to a possi-
bly innocent defendant confronting execution. Here, in particular, the penalty for
negligence should not be death. See Ledewitz, supra note 175, at 446; see also
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (1988) (holding that, despite absence
of cause, a habeas petitioner's failure to develop material facts in state court pro-
ceedings will be excused if he can show that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice
would result" from lack of a federal hearing).
423. See supra text accompanying note 411.
424. See supra note 112.
425. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
426. The opinion states:
We hold that a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a
habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of
the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole;
(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not ade-
quate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allega-
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2254(d) of the habeas statutes427 (which controls the effect in
habeas of written state court findings of fact), procedural fair-
ness and regularity in the belated new trial motion should large-
ly insulate merits decisions4 28 from further review.
Specifically, with regard to Townsend: when the State em-
ploys a procedure sufficient to afford a full and fair hearing429
on the applicant's proof and otherwise conducts the proceeding
fairly,43 1 the defendant generally will be denied a federal
hearing43l unless the State's determination was "not fairly sup-
tion of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not ade-
quately developed at the state court hearing; or (6) for any reason it ap-
pears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a
full and fair fact hearing.
Id. at 313. Even though Townsend expressly excluded situations in which newly
discovered evidence only bore on the prisoner's guilt, see supra text accompanying
notes 238-40, it did so because such circumstances did not raise a constitutional
issue and, thus, did not give rise to grounds for habeas relief. But if one accepts my
constitutionalization of Herrera claims, I think the decision should apply to them too:
Townsend plainly sought to set ground rules for hearings in habeas respecting all
constitutional claims.
427. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988); see Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1726
(1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
428. See supra note 426 (Townsend's circumstance (1)).
429. See id. (Townsend's circumstance (3)).
430. See id. (Townsend's circumstance (6)). Townsend also calls for a hearing when
"the material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing." See
id. (Townsend's circumstance (5)). This circumstance probably deals with certain
types of state obstruction already covered by other provisos. See Keeney, 112 S. Ct.
at 1721 n.5; id. at 1726-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But surely it speaks to de-
faults by the prisoner or by his attorney, if he has one. The nature of the
claim-actual innocence-would likely prevent procedural forfeiture from barring
federal court review. See supra note 356 and accompanying text. This prospect raises
the question whether, on account of circumstance (5), a defendant could initiate
repeated attempts to present new evidence-in both state and federal court-at
least, in the absence of deliberate withholding on his first Herrera motion. To avoid
such results, perhaps a state could permissibly demand a much higher threshold
showing by a repetitive Herrera claimant. Cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417
(1986) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that repeated insanity claims might be control-
lable in this manner). Under current habeas law, though, a federal court might still
have to review such claims; if so, I would change the statute. In any event, such
derelictions should be infrequent at a state hearing sought and granted on the sole
ground of new evidence, although they may occur occasionally. Cf Keeney, 112 S. Ct.
at 1716-17 (holding that defense failed to develop critical facts at a post-conviction
hearing held on validity of guilty plea).
431. It bears mention that habeas courts retain discretion to order hearings, in the
absence of a mandate to do so. Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 1727; see Townsend v. Sain,
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ported by the record as a whole."432 In line with my aim to
make Herrera adjudications as much as feasible a local affair
while not eviscerating the remedy, I would, if I could, exempt
such claims from that proviso."'
For one thing, it authorizes at least preliminary, and some-
times plenary, substantive scrutiny of state determinations of
guilt: these comprise perhaps the most intrusive form of federal
review." Then, too, since proper procedures-the Townsend
criteria's primary focus-tend to produce reliable results, dis-
pensing with it in this type of case ought not to threaten the
prisoner unduly. Here, moreover, the State possesses a greater
than usual incentive to furnish a fair hearing. Insofar as
Townsend reflects core notions of due process3 5 (or, with re-
gard to Herrera motions, adequate state corrective process),
violation of these procedural requisites, at least in some system-
ic way, should trigger not merely a federal hearing but, rather,
unconditional release.43 That would be strong medicine, in-
372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963); 1 LIEBMAN, supra note 126, § 20.4 (1988). But the same
concerns that counsel in favor of a right to state corrective process in this context
would strongly militate against such grants except in unusual circumstances.
432. See supra note 426 (Townsend's circumstance (2)).
433. Perhaps the Court could do so without congressional action since it recently
rejected the view that Congress, "in adopting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) .. .assumed the
continuing validity of all aspects of Townsend." Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 1720 n.5.
434. Speaking more generally, a pair of leading habeas scholars made the following
pertinent comments:
[D]istrict courts should search for discernible indicia of unreliability, rath-
er than engage in the treacherous process of evidence evaluation. The
most significant possible exception to this approach in Townsend is the
requirement that a hearing be held when the facts found by the state
court are not "fairly supported" by the record -.... [Tihe requirement
should therefore be read with a full appreciation of the complexities and
uncertainties inherent in reviewing findings of fact, and of the need to
preserve a meaningful role for the state courts.
Wright & Sofaer, supra note 242, at 922.
435. Cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 424 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that at least in the context of compe-
tency assessments prior to execution, the "full and fair hearing" language of
Townsend and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) embodies the same standard as procedural due
process).
436. On the one hand, once the Court, in effect, has instructed the states to estab-
lish appropriate Herrera procedures, their failure to do so should not reward them
with a "second bite at the apple." See Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159, 170 & n.9 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that comity in habeas does not require that state courts get
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deed, yet warranted, I think, if a state were to play fast and
loose with a possibly innocent death row inmate.
Lastly, the present statutory scheme calls in general for great
deference in habeas proceedings to state courts' factual findings.
Section 2254(d)437 largely replicates Townsend's categories. The
upshot, in Justice O'Connor's words, is that Townsend "work[s]
hand in hand" with the statute: "Where a petitioner has a right
to a hearing he must prove facts by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, but where he has no right to a hearing he must prove
facts by the higher standard of convincing evidence."438 In the
latter situation, "it is safe to assume" that most applicants will
fail to attain this higher standard.439
Simply put, under my proposal, if a state establishes a fair
and not unduly burdensome Herrera process and observes it in
application, it should succeed in retaining control of this ex-
tremely sensitive area. If it does not, and incurs the penalty, it
has only itself to blame.
VI. CONCLUSION
With due respect to Justice Blackmun, Herrera involved not
"simple murder""0 but complex law-in a setting of strong
competing interests of federalism and basic justice. Yet the ma-
jority of the Court should have taken more seriously the risk of
executing innocent people. Skeptical of the petitioner before
them, they adopted a blinkered approach to a problem they had
implicitly acknowledged in fashioning habeas forfeiture doctrine.
The innocence-as-gateway notion"' is bankrupt, legally and
morally, if it leads to a blind alley. I have suggested an alternate
more than one opportunity to adjudicate federal claims). On the other hand, I regard
release, as opposed to a federal hearing, as too harsh when random breaches occur
within the framework of an acceptable process.
437. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(8) (1988).
438. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1726 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing).
439. Id. Section 2254(d)(8) embodies Townsend's circumstance (2). For the reasons
stated earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 433-36 and notes 433-34, I would
wish that the Court discard it, too, in this context. In the case of a statute, howev-
er, Congress must do the necessary work.
440. See supra text accompanying note 35.
441. See supra text accompanying note 298.
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vision of innocence-as-gateway: one leading to a local forum, con-
stitutionally bound to consider post-conviction challenges to guilt
by death row inmates. In my opinion, that course would have
struck an appropriate accommodation between the State and the
individual. For now, though, the baton has passed to Congress
and, ultimately, President Clinton-whose views will very, likely
differ from both my own and those of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
